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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Corporate governance arrangements define the 
responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities of 
owners, boards of directors, and executive managers of 
a company.  Good corporate governance is as important 
for state financial institutions as for private sector 
companies.  Many of the problems that commonly 
afflict state financial institutions can be associated with, 
if not attributed directly to, weaknesses in corporate 
governance.  This note draws on guidelines recently 
published by the OECD and the Basel Committee 
This paper—a product of the Financial Systems Department, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to strengthen financial systems by improving the quality and effectiveness of state 
interventions in finance. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at dscott@worldbank.org. 
for Banking Supervision to compile a comprehensive 
corporate governance evaluation framework relevant 
to state-owned commercial and development finance 
institutions.  It highlights aspects of this framework that 
are considered to be of particular importance to state 
financial institutions by citing innovative practices in a 
number of countries.  Finally, it presents a detailed case 
study of the governance arrangements in place at the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa.   
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 I.  Introduction 
Purpose and Scope 
This note describes good corporate governance arrangements and practices for state-
owned financial institutions.  Good corporate governance is as important to state-owned 
institutions as to private sector institutions such as listed companies.  Better corporate 
governance can improve the performance of state financial institutions and can help avoid 
some of the problems they commonly experience. 
 
Corporate governance arrangements serve to define the responsibilities, authorities and 
accountabilities of owners, boards of directors, and executive managers, as they affect the 
control a company.  Put another way, “corporate governance refers to the process and 
structure for overseeing the direction and management of a corporation so that it carries 
out its mandate and objectives effectively.”
1  And corporate governance “provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.  Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and it shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring.”
2   
 
This note addresses corporate governance practices in wholly state-owned financial 
institutions.
3  State-owned financial institutions can be distinguished as between deposit-
takers and non-deposit-takers, and as between development institutions (i.e., with public 
policy mandates) and commercial institutions (with no explicit public policy mandate).  
In this note the term state commercial bank (SCB) is used to refer to profit (or value) 
maximizing deposit-takers that do not have a mandate to pursue public policy objectives.  
Such banks exist in many countries, often a legacy of central planning.
4   The term state 
development bank (SDB) refers to institutions that have explicit policy mandates and are 
funded primarily by deposits.
5  Thus both SCB and SDB in this note are presumed to take 
deposits from the general public and for that reason are subject to (or at least should be 
subject to) the full scope of regulation and supervision applied to other deposit-taking 
institutions.
6  The term development financial institution (DFI) refers to institutions that 
are presumed to be financed mainly by non-deposit resources, such as loans from the 
state, long term loans from multilateral institutions, and bonds issued in local and 
international capital markets.  Like SDB, DFI are presumed to have an explicit policy 
                                                 
1 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, February 2005, Chapter 7. 
2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, page 11. 
3 Subsequent work will address additional corporate governance practices relevant to financial institutions 
partially owned by the state. 
4 Examples are the four large SCBs in China and the three large SCBs in Egypt.  All have been explicitly 
relieved by the government from any public policy mandate.  In many cases, such as these, SCBs are being 
partially or fully privatized.  Three of China’s have raised private equity, and one of Egypt’s SCBs has 
recently been privatized. 
5 Thus the terminology used in this note differs from common usage, since many institutions called 
development banks in practice take no or only limited deposits. 
6 The term “bank” in this note therefore is synonymous with “deposit-taker.”  Deposit-taking is seen by the 
international bank supervisory community as the principal rationale for prudential regulation and 
supervision. 
  2mandate.  In this note, all three types of institution (SCB, SDB, DFI) are referred to 
collectively as state financial institutions (SFI), a class of state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
 
Effective corporate governance arrangements for SFIs are built upon sound legal, 
regulatory and institutional foundations.  Relevant laws and regulations can include the 
company law, securities laws (e.g., governing the issuance and sale of securities to the 
public), laws governing auditing and accounting, SOEs, and public financial management, 
as well as institution-specific founding/organic legislation and, in the case of deposit-
takers, general commercial banking law and prudential regulation.
7   Relevant 
institutional foundations include policies and practices governing the state’s exercise of 
ownership in SOEs or SFIs generally.  They also include policies and practices applicable 
to the board and management of each SFI, including as prescribed in its internal statutes 
(e.g., articles of incorporation or association, charter, by-laws, etc.), and as prescribed by 
the owner and the board of directors. 
  
This note draws extensively upon several recently published authoritative sources, 
including the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), the OECD Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005), and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision’s Enhancing the Corporate Governance for Banking 
Organizations (2006).  It cites recent developments in a number of countries, including 
Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden.  It also draws 
upon a detailed case study assessment of one SFI considered to be well advanced in its 
corporate governance practices, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, that was 
undertaken for the purposes of illustrating the corporate governance arrangement 
advocated in this note. 
 
The goal of the note is to contribute to work undertaken with the World Bank Group 
geared toward helping client government’s improve the effectiveness of state 
interventions in finance.  Proactive policies to promote financial sector development in 
the context of overall economic development and growth strategies often involve the 
direct provision of financial services by the state, and state financial institutions are a 
means commonly used for this purpose.  Improving the performance of such institutions 
in many dimensions is important to overall financial sector development.  This work by 
the Financial Systems Department is a complement to initiatives focusing more 
comprehensively on corporate governance matters undertaken within the World Bank 
Group by the Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Department (CCGDR).   
Why Does SFI Governance Matter? 
Many of the problems commonly recognized to afflict SFIs can be associated with, if not 
attributed directly to, weaknesses in corporate governance.  Some examples: 
•  Government officials acting in the capacity of owners (the minister to whom the SFI 
is accountable, or other individuals) directly intervene in day-to-day operational 
decisions, such as to whom to lend, on what terms to lend, and when to forgive 
indebtedness. 
                                                 
7 In addition, contract law, labor law, bankruptcy law and tax law may be relevant. 
  3•  Executive managers act with near autonomy, pursue unintended objectives, and 
operate in a manner contrary to sound commercial business and public financial 
management principles. 
•  Board members lack the independence, professional skills and experience necessary 
to properly undertake their duties. 
•  Internal and external financial and non-financial reporting is incomplete and 
inaccurate, does not provide an adequate basis for decision-making by boards and 
executive managers, and misleads government owners, legislatures and the public. 
 
The consequence of the types of problems cited above can be not only loss-making, 
inefficient and/or ineffective SFIs, but also a weakened financial system.  Poor 
governance can lead SFIs to under-price risks and otherwise engage in business practices 
that displace the provision of commercial financial services by the private sector, impede 
new private entry, and undermine competition.  The result can be to retard financial 
market development, to diminish access to financial services, and to weaken the stability 
of the financial system, often the opposite of the stated rationale for government 
ownership of financial institutions in the first place.   
 
In contrast, good corporate governance can help to ensure that SFIs are conceived and 
managed within a clear vision of how they will overcome existing weaknesses or 
problems in the provision of needed financial services without becoming part of the 
problem themselves.  It can ensure that SFIs pursue the objectives for which they were 
established, preventing mission creep and an institutional tendency to continue to grow in 
size and expand in scope.  It can increase the confidence of clients and business partners, 
and lower SFIs’ cost of funds.  It can facilitate the ability of the government to attract 
private capital for eventual ownership diversification and perhaps even privatization. 
 
Yet this note will demonstrate that putting in place and maintaining the corporate 
governance arrangements necessary to adequately guide and control SFIs is not simple or 
inexpensive.  The governance of any SOE can be more challenging than in private 
companies.  In part this is because the structure of SOE ownership is more complex, 
involving the legislature, the government, and one or more ministries, such that 
organizing and exercising the ownership function itself is a challenge.  In addition SOEs 
are at risk to ad hoc political interventions in the guise of exercising ownership.  On the 
other hand, SOEs usually are not at risk to two sources of incentives for sound 
governance and management, specifically, bankruptcy and takeover. 
 
SFI governance arrangements can be even more challenging to put in place than SOEs 
generally.  Like most financial institutions, SFIs often are highly leveraged (high debt 
relative to equity) and thus have the potential to create significant contingent fiscal 
liabilities.  For that reason, public financial management considerations are particularly 
important for SFIs, implying a routine role for finance ministries in governance.  SCB 
and SDB, as deposit-taking institutions, should be subject to the regulatory regime 
applicable to other deposit-takers, which typically includes extensive prescriptions 
regarding governance arrangements, as well as the supervision of such arrangements by 
the central bank or other bank supervisory authority.  SDB and DFI, which have public 
policy mandates, present further governance challenges, notably with respect to 
managing the tradeoffs inherent in conflicting objectives (e.g., offering concessionary 




In practice, putting in place sound governance arrangements for SFIs requires a 
significant investment in people, processes and technology, with substantial up-front and 
ongoing costs.  When considered in the context of the government’s objectives for SFIs 
and the problems they are expected to solve, the costs often may not be justified or 
affordable.  In such circumstances the answer is not to shortchange corporate governance, 
but rather to design alternative, more economical and efficient means for government 
intervention. 
 
Finally, it is important to be realistic about the potential for positive outcomes from 
concerted efforts to upgrade SFI governance arrangements.  Good governance put in 
place on paper, but not implemented or respected in practice, will have little effect.   
Failure to ensure accurate accounting and reporting and to promote transparency at all 
levels will undermine other improvements.  Even if a serious and comprehensive 
governance reform is implemented, sustaining those reforms through successive 
government administrations will present challenges.  And, in any case, upgrading 
governance will not solve all problems.  But doing so will help professionalize ownership, 
boards, and management, and can be a first step along the path toward further enhancing 
performance by means of partial or even full privatization. 
Section II.  Key SFI Governance Arrangements and Practices 
Overview 
As noted, corporate governance practices should serve to clarify the respective 
responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities of owners, boards of directors, and 
executive managers.  For any SFI, two overarching objectives for which boards and 
executive managers must be held accountable are: 
•  To ensure the institution’s long-run financial sustainability (i.e., ensure that it 
continues as a going concern, without need for extraordinary financial support from 
the state). 
•  To achieve certain financial performance objectives (which may be defined in terms 
of return on equity and dividend payment targets, for example).   
 
For SFI with a mandate to pursue public policy objectives (i.e., SDB and DFI), an 
additional overarching objective is the achievement of those policy objectives.  (Section 
III of this note addresses the special governance challenges associated with SDB/DFI.) 
 
To be able to hold owners, boards and executive managers accountable, objectives and 
expectations must be explicit and clear.
9  To function effectively, owners, boards and 
executive managers must have access to accurate, timely and relevant information upon 
which to base decisions and assess performance.  Key underpinnings for accountability, 
                                                 
8 This is not to say that SCB (or private commercial banks for that matter) face no conflicts in their 
objectives.  For such institutions, profit/value maximization requires balancing potentially conflicting 
objectives with respect to different sets of stakeholders.  Also, this is not to suggest that SCB or private 
commercial banks cannot produce valuable public policy outcomes.    
9 Government owners are held accountable by legislatures, and in principle by the public. 
  5therefore, are clarity and transparency regarding objectives, expectations, actions taken, 
results achieved, and costs incurred. 
 
This Section highlights corporate governance arrangements and practices drawn from 
OECD guidelines that are advocated here as being critical to effective SFI performance, 
and as being matters on which SFIs often fall short.  It addresses i) state exercise of 
ownership, ii) the role and functioning of the board of directors, and iii) the supporting 
information, reporting, disclosure and transparency regime.  A more comprehensive 
compilation of good corporate governance practices is presented in Section IV in the 
form of an evaluation framework and case study using that framework. 
State Exercise of Ownership 
With ownership of a company comes the right to influence the company, to obtain 
information from the company, and to participate in the profits of the company.  The 
principal tasks associated with ownership include: i) to participate in shareholders’ 
meetings and to vote upon matters that, by law and/or internal company statute,
10 must be 
decided upon by the shareholders;
11 ii) to elect/appoint and, if necessary, to remove 
members of the board of directors; and iii) to obtain and assess information from the 
company and from others that is necessary to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
the board, executive management and the company itself.     
 
Organizing the State Ownership Function 
 
•  State Ownership Policy 
The manner in which the state organizes the tasks inherent in SFI ownership serves as the 
foundation for overall corporate governance.  As noted in Section I, the ownership 
arrangements will be shaped by laws and regulations and by state policy.  Taken together, 
the applicable legal and policy regime should provide a consistent and comprehensive 
framework for the organization and exercise of state ownership. 
 
One means to help promote a consistent, comprehensive framework for state ownership 
is to articulate a formal ownership policy.  The ownership policy would define the 
state’s overall ownership objectives, prescribe legal forms for SFIs,
12 define the state’s 
role in governance, and set out how that role and its overall ownership policy will be 
implemented.  The ownership policy would be published, and would not be subject to 
frequent change.   
 
Formulating, adopting and publicly disseminating an ownership policy along these lines 
can help clarify and reinforce the authorities and responsibilities of the owner, and can 
provide more clear guidance to the board.  Minimizing changes to the policy will help 
provide a predictable basis for governance and management.  An increasing number of 
                                                 
10 Such as the company’s constitution, articles of incorporation or association, charter, by-laws, or similar 
governing documents. 
11 For SFIs and other SOEs, these will generally include dividend policies, authorization of major 
acquisitions or divestitures, significant change in scope of business, and the like. 
12 For example, whether the institution should be incorporated under the company law and made fully 
subject to that law.  Also relevant in this context is the consideration of whether an incorporated financial 
institution is the most effective means of state intervention, as compared to, for example, a perhaps more 
economical institutional arrangement such as a specialized government department or unit. 
  6countries are adopting formal ownership policies, including Sweden, Finland, France, and 
Poland.  See Box A for a brief description of the ownership policy in Sweden. 
 
Box A – Sweden’s Ownership Policy  
 
The Swedish government administers ownership of 41 wholly-owned and 14 partly-owned companies and groups with 
a total value of approximately SEK 500 billion (US$ 70 billion).  The government has published an Ownership Policy 
defining the manner in which it administers ownership in all SOEs.   
 
The policy highlights the constitutional basis for the administration of state property, and describes and differentiates 
the roles of the government administration and those of the legislature.  The government’s mandate is explicit 
(“actively monitor and manage the state’s assets in order to achieve the best long-term development of value (and, in 
those cases where it is applicable – to comply with the special societal interests).  SOEs in Sweden are explicitly 
subject to the same legislation as privately-owned companies.  
 
The Swedish Code for Corporate Control, published in 2004, developed by an expert group of representatives of the 
Swedish business community, and applicable to all listed firms, serves as the principal basis for the conduct of state 
ownership.  The Ownership Policy makes clear where it varies from prescriptions in the Code.  The Code’s Rules for 
Corporate Governance are annexed to the Ownership Policy. 
 
The Ownership Policy sets out principles for the administration of SOEs that address, among other matters, legislative 
and public participation in annual shareholders meetings, board member qualifications, board composition, board size, 
board member tenure, participation of government officials as board members, the board appointment process, and the 
disclosure of fees paid to board members.  The policy prohibits managing directors (CEOs) of state companies from 
serving on the board (citing the appointment and dismissal of the managing director as one the board’s most important 
tasks).  The policy prescribes the manner in which the external auditor is to be appointed, placing ultimate 
responsibility on the owner representative for auditor selection. 
 
The policy requires that SOEs be at least as transparent as listed companies, and places responsibility on the board to 
ensure that specific standards are met as the basis for reporting.  The board is required to disclose in the annual report 
its application of the government’s Ownership Policy and guidelines (including those governing external financial 
reporting).  The government, in turn, submits an official annual report on the administration of SOEs to the legislature 




•  Shareholder Representatives 
Two critical elements in organizing the state’s ownership function are to make clear who 
is responsible and accountable for functioning as the state’s shareholder representative 
(i.e., acting as owner on behalf of the state), and to define the shareholder representative’s 
role and accountabilities. 
 
In many countries, SFIs (and SOEs generally) fall within the administrative portfolio of 
individual ministers, such that, for example, the minister of agriculture serves as the 
state’s shareholder representative for the national agricultural development bank.  In 
some countries it is required that two or more ministers share this responsibility, such as 
in New Zealand, where shares in most SOEs are held in equal amounts by a “Responsible 
Minister” and the Minister of Finance, who together comprise the “Shareholding 
Ministers.”  In other countries, such as Canada and South Africa, while a single minister 
serves a shareholder representative, the Minister of Finance plays an explicit role in 
overseeing and authorizing the shareholding minister’s actions by virtue of 
responsibilities and authorities set out in public sector financial management legislation. 
  
Arrangements involving two ministers offer the potential advantage of better balancing 
the interests and goals of sectoral ministers (e.g. agriculture, housing) with those of the 
ministers responsible for public sector finance, performance and efficiency, and 
  7mitigating the potential for unilateral action by a single minister that runs contrary to 
good corporate governance.  These advantages are particularly relevant with respect to 
deposit-taking SFIs, where poor performance can create potentially unrecognized 
contingent fiscal liabilities arising from the protection of depositors, and by virtue of 
which the minister of finance should have an important governance role.
13   
 
In any case, to preserve individual accountability, when two or more ministers share 
responsibility, it is important that respective duties and authorities be clearly 
differentiated.  See Box B for a description of how several countries have provided for 
clarity as to shareholder representative responsibilities and authorities as well as checks 
and balances on such authority. 
 
Box B – Strengthening the Shareholder Representative Function 
 
SFI under the control of a single minister, in an environment where the state’s expectations regarding the 
responsibilities and accountabilities of the shareholder representative are not well defined, is likely a key source of poor 
SFI performance.  Ensuring clarity regarding the role of a shareholder representative, and putting in place appropriate 
checks and balances, can lay a better foundation for good governance. 
 
In New Zealand, SOE shares generally are held in equal amounts by the Responsible Minister and the Minister of 
Finance (together comprising the Shareholding Ministers).  The functions of Shareholding Ministers are set out in the 
Companies Act, the SOE Act and in company-specific legislation.  Shareholding Ministers are accountable to the 
House of Representatives for the performance of those functions. 
 
In South Africa, under the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), each SOE is accountable both to a minister (the 
shareholder representative, referred to as the “executive authority” in the Act), and to the Minister of Finance, in his 
capacity as the head of the National Treasury.  (In only one SFI, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, does the 
Minister of Finance at the same time serve as the executive authority for the SFI.)  The shareholder representative is 
accountable to Parliament for the performance of the SOE.  The PFMA and institution-specific legislation set out the 
responsibilities and authorities for shareholder representatives and for the Minister of Finance with respect to SOEs, as 
well as detailed reporting responsibilities for SOE boards.    
 
In Canada, the Financial Administration Act sets out the legislative basis for the governance and accountability 
framework for SOEs.   It sets outs the authorities and responsibilities of the minister functioning as shareholder 
representative, and assigns specific tasks for shareholder representative oversight to the Minister of Finance as well as 
other bodies in the executive branch.  The shareholding minister is accountable to Parliament for the performance of 
the SOE.   
 
In recent years, there has been a centralization of responsibility for SOE ownership 
functions in countries such as Sweden, Singapore, Poland and Chile, where a single 
minister now is responsible for functioning as the state’s shareholder representative in all 
or most SOEs, including SFIs.  Carrying this trend a step farther, Norway and Finland 
have set up specialized ownership units within ministries for this purpose.  In Norway, 
for example, in 2002 the Department of Ownership was established as a separate 
department within the Ministry of Trade and Industry responsible for managing the state 
ownership in 20 companies, coordinating the activities of all other ministries involved in 
state ownership, and preparing the State Ownership Report, an annual report on the 
administration of the ownership within all the ministries.   
 
The case study in Section IV of this note sets out more detailed guidelines regarding the 
responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities of SFI shareholder representatives. 
                                                 
13 The state’s contingent liability for non-deposit-taking SFIs are likely to be better identified and 
controlled within normal public financial management arrangements, in contrast to contingent liabilities for 
repaying deposits. 
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•  Professional Support to Shareholder Representatives 
Ministers functioning as shareholder representatives have critical roles to play.  To 
function effectively, they should be supported by a professional staff with relevant skills 
and expertise.  An increasing number of countries are establishing specialized bodies 
tasked with providing expert support to ministers functioning as shareholder 
representative.  Examples include in New Zealand the Crown Company Monitoring 
Advisory Unit, a semi-autonomous unit attached to the Treasury, in Australia the Office 
of Government owned corporations (Queensland), in the United Kingdom the 
Shareholder Executive within the Department of Trade and Industry, in France the 
French Government Shareholding Agency in the Ministry of Finance, and in Canada the 
Crown Agencies Secretariat within the Ministry of Finance, British Columbia.  Box C 
describes the Crown Company Monitoring and Advisory Unit in New Zealand, as an 
example. 
 
Box C – Professional Support to Shareholder Representatives in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, the administration of state ownership is supported by the Crown Company Monitoring and Advisory 
Unit (CCMAU).  The unit was established in 1993 to advise shareholding ministers on SOE performance and to 
recommend qualified persons to sit on SOE boards.  CCMAU is situated administratively within the Treasury, but is 
independent in operational and financial terms.  Funding is provided by SOEs and other state entities.  
 
The CCMAU provides advice in the areas of monitoring (reporting on company business plans, performance against 
targets), ownership functions (advising on strategic issues, investment and diversification opportunities, and the impact 
of government policy), identifying and screening potential directors, managing the board appointments process, and 
promoting corporate governance best practices. 
 
The Treasury and CCMAU have joint responsibilities in the area of state ownership administration.  Their roles are 
complementary.  CCMAU primarily focuses on performance, commercial aspects and risks at the company level. 
CCMAU also advises on board composition and performance. The Treasury focuses mainly on broader issues relating 
to SOE’s overall balance sheet and fiscal position. 
 
The CCMAU has published a number of documents which articulate the legal, regulatory and policy framework 
applicable to SOEs in New Zealand, and helps shareholding ministers and board members understand their 
responsibilities and accountabilities.  A key document is the 2002 Owners Expectation Manual, which outlines 





•  Separation of Ownership from Regulation and Supervision 
It is an accepted principle of SOE ownership that there be a clear separation of 
responsibility within government for exercising ownership, on the one hand, and for 
exercising regulatory and supervisory responsibilities, on the other.  This is of particular 
importance in the context of deposit-taking SFIs, which are more relatively heavily 
regulated than other SFIs and most other type of SOEs.  Combining both ownership and 
regulatory/supervisory functions (for example, within the central bank) presents conflicts 





  9Constituting the Board of Directors
14
 
•  The Board Appointment Process 
A key ownership task is to appoint the board of directors.  An appropriately constituted, 
qualified and empowered board of directors is an essential component of good corporate 
governance.  The board appointments process is thus a key governance matter.  Too often 
SFI board member appointments are seen as a form of political patronage, with the result 
that the board does not collectively possess the necessary skills and experience to do its 
job.  A better approach is for the shareholder representative to use a structured and 
transparent board appointment process that adheres to explicit policies and procedures 
and seeks to ensure the ability of the board to exercise its responsibilities in an 
independent manner, including the use of competence and experience requirements 
consistent with the strategy and business of the SFI.
15   
 
A number of countries have taken steps in this direction in recent years.  In some 
countries, legal and regulatory requirements have been modified to mandate use of skill 
and experience criteria by the shareholder representative or other parties with 
appointment powers.  In some instances, this involves a requirement for a board 
subcommittee (e.g. a nominations or remuneration committee) to assess the skill 
requirements of the board, and the capacities of existing board members, and to make 
recommendations to the shareholder representative.  In other cases, specialized units have 
been created within government to coordinate and advise on the appointments process.  
Canada is an example of the former, while New Zealand is an example of the latter.  See 
Box D for a description of the board and chairperson appointment processes in those two 
countries. 
 
•  Issues in Board Composition 
Besides ensuring that the board collectively has the proper mix of skills and capacities, 
two other key questions that arise with respect to board composition are whether public 
servants should serve on the board of a SFI (or SOE), and whether the Chief Executive 




                                                 
14 The reference here is to the board responsible for governing the institution and overseeing the executive 
management.  In countries with a unitary board structure, this is the board of directors that normally will 
include executive and non-executive directors.  In countries with a two-tier board structure, the reference is 
to the supervisory board (on contrast to the management board, which is normally composed entirely of 
executive directors/managers). 
15 Such a board appointment process might well be applicable to all SOEs. 
  10Box D – Board and Chairperson Appointment Processes in Canada and New Zealand 
 
The Canadian Financial Administration Act provides that the shareholder representative (“responsible minister” in the 
terms of the Act) appoints directors with the approval of the Governor in Council, following a review of the 
recommendation by the Prime Minister.  In the past, in practice, the qualification criteria employed by ministers, and 
the extent to which the board or chairperson of the board was consulted in the process, varied considerably.   
 
In March 2004 the Canadian government adopted significant changes to the SOE board and chairperson appointment 
process.  Boards of directors must establish a nominating committee to identify board and chairperson candidates, and 
are expected to seek the assistance of an executive search firm.  The nominating committee must develop a competency 
profile for the board (a description of the experience, attributes and skills that should be possessed by the board as a 
whole).  The profile is to be based on the roles and responsibilities of the board, including considerations relevant to the 
industry in which the firm operates.  In filling board positions, the committee is to assess the skills already on the 
board, and identify specific competencies required to complete the skills mix.  For board chairpersons, the committee is 
to develop specific selection criteria.  The board profile and selection criteria are to be discussed with the responsible 
minister and well as others in the executive branch.  To fill positions, the committee formulates a list of suitable 
candidates which is submitted to the board, which in turn submits an approved short-list to the responsible minister, 
who makes the recommendation for appointment. 
 
In New Zealand, Shareholding Ministers have the responsibility to appoint directors, chairpersons and deputy 
chairpersons.  CCMAU assists ministers in fulfilling their responsibilities by administering a Cabinet-approved process 
for identification and appointment of directors.  Key tasks performed by CCMAU in this process include: identification 
and pre-screening of potential candidates; assessing future skill requirements for board vacancies and preparing a 
position specification in collaboration with company chairpersons and the Shareholding Ministers; matching candidates 
with skill requirements; and submitting qualified candidates to Shareholding Ministers.  Once Shareholding Ministers 
identify their preferred candidate, CCMAU and the chairperson undertake a due diligence process that further assesses 
the candidate’s suitability and identifies and evaluates any conflicts of interests that may exist.  Where necessary, 
CCMAU conducts reference and credit checks.   
 
Shareholding Ministers make the final decision, either selecting the preferred candidate or requesting that other 
candidates be identified.  By convention, the Shareholding Ministers’ selection is reviewed by the Cabinet prior to final 
decision.  Ministers are required to certify that they have followed the Cabinet-approved appointment process and have 
appointed the best qualified candidate, and that there are no unmanageable conflicts of interest issues in the 
appointment.  Selected candidates are provided a written terms of reference describing the Responsible Minister’s 
expectations for the appointee.  CCMAU conducts general induction seminars for groups of confirmed appointees.  
Company-specific induction is the responsibility of the company’s board chairperson. 
 
In very few countries are public servants (such as a deputy minister reporting to the 
minister who is the SFI’s shareholder representative) prohibited from serving on the 
board.  Norway is one country where such a prohibition is in place.  The concern is that 
the public servant would be seen by other board members as having inordinate powers, 
and therefore be in a position to inappropriately influence the decisions and direction of 
the board.  For this reason, in some countries such as Canada there is an ongoing debate 
about whether to prohibit public servant board appoints.
16  While there certainly is a need 
for the board to have access to the views of the shareholder, this should be accomplished 
by structured arrangements for interactions between the shareholder representative, the 
chairperson of the board, and the board itself (as described below), rather than having a 
proxy for the shareholder representative sit on the board with a special role in articulating 
policy.  In any case, when public servants are appointed to the board, their number should 
be limited, they should meet the requisite skill and experience requirements, and they 
should have the same obligations and roles as any other board member. 
 
The question as to whether the CEO should be prohibited from serving as chairperson of 
the board is one confronted in many countries in both the private and public sector.  
                                                 
16 A reevaluation of the policy permitting public servants to serve as board members was called for by the 
Auditor General in 2005. 
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positions.  Some countries, such as Finland, Norway, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
already have a prohibition in place with respect to SOEs generally.  Since an important 
objective of the corporate governance practices advocated in this note is that the board do 
a better job in overseeing management, the separation of the two positions seems well 
advised.  This can be a decision taken at the level of an individual SFI by the shareholder 
representative.  This is the case of the DBSA, for example.  
 
Clarifying Shareholder Representative Objectives and Expectations 
 
•  Setting Financial and Non-financial Performance Objectives 
The state (and thus the shareholder representative) cannot function as a passive 
shareholder, especially in wholly-owned SFIs, whether the SFI pursues public policy 
objectives or not.  Failure to define clear objectives and performance measures and 
targets opens the door to a number of problems, including inappropriate political 
interventions in day-to-day managerial decisions, excessive management autonomy 
(leading to self-interested activity and mission creep or drift beyond that which was 
intended), and difficulties in measuring and evaluating the performance of the board, 
management and institution.   
 
As advocated above, for any SFI two overriding objectives are to ensure the institution’s 
long-run financial sustainability and to meet financial performance objectives specified 
by the owner.  These high-level objectives should be codified in law or regulation, or in 
the state’s ownership policy.  Similarly, the public policy objectives of SDB/DFI should 
be made similarly explicit.  (The special challenges faced in defining SDB/DFI policy 
objectives, balancing policy and financial sustainability objectives, and measuring policy 
performance, are discussed in Section III.) 
 
The shareholder representative, in consultation with the board, should further specify SFI 
objectives, and translate them into performance measures and targets.  At a minimum, 
this would include specifying financial performance targets, which might include 
profitability, capitalization and dividend payment targets, as well as operational targets 
designed to ensure the SFI adheres to commercial business practices, operates efficiently, 
and is funded prudently.  The shareholder representative could well specify other 
objectives.  For example, in the case of SCB, despite having no public policy mandate, 
the shareholder representative might specify objectives designed to ensure that the 
institution adds value within the context of the existing commercial financial services 
industry landscape, so that executive management and the board are not simply left to 
compete only in the same markets as other private financial institutions. 
 
To achieve this in practice, the shareholder representative and the board should enter into 
written agreements documenting corporate missions, objectives, and strategies, as well as 
specific financial and non-financial performance targets.  In South Africa, for example, 
regulations issued by the Treasury, under the Public Financial Management Act, requires 
that the shareholder representative annually conclude a Shareholder Compact with SOE 
boards.  In the case of the DBSA, the Shareholder Compact is signed by the Minister of 
Finance (as shareholder representative), the chairperson of the board (on behalf of 
DBSA), a representative of the Office of the Minister of Finance (on behalf of the 
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committee.  The Shareholder Compact documents the government’s policy and strategic 
objectives as well as key performance measures and indicators to be attained by DBSA.   
A statutorily mandated Corporate Plan is annexed to the Shareholder Compact and 
elaborates upon agreed objectives, performance indicators and quantitative targets.  In 
practice, the strategic objectives and performance measures and targets generally are 
proposed by the CEO, executive management and the board, and agreed with the 
Minister as shareholder representative. They form the basis of reporting by the board on 
performance against specific financial and non-financial objectives in the Annual Report 
and in other reports.  (See Section III for additional information.) 
 
Another example, representing a somewhat more structured arrangement for specifying 
and documenting shareholder representative expectations, is that of the State of 
Queensland in Australia, which recently issued guidance to SOE boards and executive 
managers for agreeing with shareholder representatives annual Statements of Corporate 
Intent, as well as five-year Corporate Plans. See Box E for details. 
 
Box E – Statement of Corporate Intent – The State of Queensland 
 
The Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) is a formal annual performance agreement between SOE boards and 
Shareholding Ministers.  It serves as the basis for quarterly reporting to Shareholding Ministers, as well as regular 
management reports to the board. The SCI is the basis of Shareholding Ministers’ assessments of whether and how 
successfully the SOE achieves its financial and non-financial targets and outcomes, and is thus a principal tool for 
promoting board accountability.  Financial and non-financial performance targets set out in the SCI also are expected to 
be reflected in the performance contracts of the Chief Executive Officer and other senior executive managers. 
 
In 2006, the Queensland Treasury issued new guidelines for SCIs.  SCIs are to be based on the five-year Corporate 
Plans each SOE must agree with their Shareholding Minister.  The Corporate Plan is a forward-looking document that 
defines, among other matters, the SOE’s vision and mission, its business objectives and priorities for the medium and 
long-term, its strategies for achieving those objectives and priorities, and the anticipated corporate, financial and non-
financial outcomes of those strategies.   
 
The 2006 guidelines specify the content and suggested format of SCIs.  SCI content is to include a summary of key 
corporate objectives and strategies, including a statement of the SOE’s core business, identification of its corporate and 
operational objectives and corporate strategies, quantifiable corporate performance objectives (business development, 
asset/liability structure, cost structure, etc.).  By statute, the SCI must include annual financial and non-financial 
performance targets for the SOE.  Financial targets and other financial performance indicators must be identified, and 
historic and budgeted values provided.  Non-financial targets must be identified and presented in the same format.  Key 
assumptions underlying the targets must be provided, including economic assumptions, and business-specific financial 
and operating assumptions.  The SCI must include historic and budgeted balance sheets, income statements and cash 
flow statements, both on a consolidated basis and for major legal entities (parent, subsidiaries).  The contribution to 
corporate targets of major business lines should be specified.  The SCI also is to include statements regarding financial 
control, risk management and corporate governance practices, among other matters, and details on remuneration 
agreements for board members, the CEO and other key executive managers.  The SCI must be signed by the board, or 




•  Periodic Mandate Reviews 
Over time, SFI can come to be engaged in activities and pursuing objectives that were 
never envisioned by the state or the shareholder representative.  Even where a SFI 
remains focused on a clear and specific mandate, the evolution of markets, client needs, 
and public policy objectives may render the mandate no longer valid or appropriate. 
 
  13One mechanism governments can adopt to mitigate the risk that mandates become 
outdated is periodic mandate reviews.  Some countries are beginning to adopt policies 
requiring such reviews.  The Auditor General of Canada, for example, in a December 
2000 report, cited the need for more systematic reviews of SOE corporate mandates.  The 
report suggested that the government adopt guidelines for the conduct of regular, periodic 
mandate reviews.  Mandate reviews would be led by the shareholder representative and 
supported by outside expertise.  The review would assess the continuing validity of the 
mandate, including an assessment of the SOEs record of cost-effective performance.  The 
results of the review would be shared with all parties in the SOE accountability 
framework, including Parliament. 
 
In South Africa, the mandate of DBSA is subject to periodic internal and external review.  
The current review (2007) is being undertaken in the context of a broader review of the 
overall development finance system, including all state development finance institutions. 
The Board of Directors 
The principal roles of the board should include i) to appoint key executives, to evaluate 
management performance, and to develop a succession plan for key managers; ii) to help 
formulate, monitor and approve the institution’s strategy;
17 iii) to approve key policies; iv) 
to ensure that internal financial and operational controls are in place; v) to establish 
performance indicators and benchmarks;
18 and vi) to monitor disclosure and public 
communications processes to ensure financial statements and other disclosures fairly 
present the institution’s performance, financial condition, business and risks.   
 
Many of these roles may be prescribed in law and regulation.  To the extent they are not, 
they should be made explicit by the shareholder representative.  Key purposes in doing so 
are to ensure that board members understand their role, to differentiate their role from 
that of executive management, and to make explicit the board’s legitimacy and authority 
to oversee management and hold it accountable. 
 
Appointing the CEO and Holding Executive Management Accountable 
 
•  The CEO Appointment Process 
In many countries, the shareholder representative (or a higher ranking member of the 
government administration, such as the Prime Minister or President), has the power to 
appoint the CEO.  While quite common in practice, this arrangement clearly undermines 
the ability of the board to hold the CEO and executive management accountable, and in 
turn undermines the ability of the shareholder representative to hold the board 
accountable.   
 
The board should have a direct role in the appointment and potential dismissal of the 
CEO.  In Norway, Finland and New Zealand, SOE boards are granted authority to recruit, 
                                                 
17 In the context of objectives set out in the ownership policy and further elaborated by the shareholder 
representative in agreements with the board such as a shareholder compact,  statement of corporate intent 
and corporate plan. 
18 Elaborating upon those set by the shareholder representative. 
  14hire, dismiss and set the compensation of the CEO.
19  More countries will likely move in 
this direction.  For example, in 2006 a Canadian government commission recommended 
that SOE boards be given the power to appoint and dismiss the board, and the 
Government of British Columbia has already granted this authority to the boards of 
provincial level SOEs. 
 
When it proves politically impractical to give the board explicit authority to appoint and 
dismiss the CEO, an alternative arrangement is for the board at least to take the lead in 
the CEO recruitment process.  In this model, the board, or a board committee, would lead 
the search for CEO candidates.  The board would recommend a shortlist of candidates to 
the shareholder representative, and interview short-listed candidates.  The shareholder 
representative would then interview the candidates and make the selection in consultation 
with the board.  This approach has been used in certain instances in Canada, where it is 
viewed by chairpersons, boards and CEOs as the most effective arrangement among 
several alternatives in supporting good corporate governance and a strong accountability 
relationship between the CEO and the board.
20   
 
In exercising its authority to appoint or participate in the appointment of the CEO, the 
board should adopt clear rules and procedures.  Selection criteria should be explicit, and 
based on professional qualifications and experience.  The board might well utilize the 
services of a professional executive search firm to support their efforts.   
 
When adopting arrangements granting the board greater authority to appoint the CEO, or 
to participate in CEO selection, there may be a need for transitional arrangements in 
certain SFIs, for example, where the board itself is not be properly constituted (e.g., 
members do not meet the qualification criteria suggested earlier in this note) or there are 
significant gaps on the board (e.g. vacant seats, members serving beyond the expiration 
of their term pending replacement).  The nature of the transitional arrangements will very, 
but should have as their goal providing assurance that the board is sufficiently supported 
by the government and/or outside professional firms in the task of recruiting the CEO.  
 
•  CEO Compensation 
A necessary complement to the authority of the board to appoint the CEO or influence 
CEO selection, and to its responsibility to monitor management performance, is that it 
have significant influence over CEO compensation.  In principle, CEO compensation 
should be market-based, and related to performance.  Some countries have begun to 
define explicit guidelines for CEO (as well as director) compensation.  For example, in 
Norway, the state has issued advisory guidelines for wholly-owned SOEs which state that 
“the wage development in companies fully-owned by the State should be competitive, but 
not pacesetting in terms of wage development within their industries.”  Similarly, in 
Australia, the government has issued policy documents describing the principles and 
guidelines for remuneration of CEOs and other executives in SOEs and expectations of 
                                                 
19 In Finland, SOE boards are to follow Helsinki Stock Exchange guidelines for CEO appointments.  The 
shareholder representative retains the power to dismiss the CEO in certain circumstances. 
20 The alternatives were an arrangement where the shareholder representative and the state select the CEO 
and notify the board, and where the shareholder representative and state select the CEO in consultation with 
the chairperson as a proxy for the board.  Governance of Crown Corporations, Report of the Auditor 
General of Canada, December 2000.  
  15the board in this regard.  The board is expected to establish, approve and maintain a 
remuneration policy for senior executives and provide detailed information to 
shareholders and the public on remuneration policy. 
 
Organizing the Work of the Board 
 
•  Overall Board Mandate 
The role and organization of the board to some extent will be set by law and regulation, 
and further defined in the state’s ownership policy and by the shareholder representative.  
One tool by which to elaborate and give emphasis to these legal, regulatory and policy 
requirements is through a board charter.  A board charter would present in one document 
the various requirements that guide the operation of the board.  It would thus serve as a 
key source of guidance to board members, and an important component of the board 
orientation process.  Such a charter is a requirement of the South African government’s 
Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector.  See Box F for a description of 
DBSA’s board charter. 
 
Box F – The Board Charter of the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
 
The DBSA Board Charter is a document agreed by the shareholder representative and the board.  The purpose of the 
Charter is to highlight key provisions of relevant legislation relating to the composition, powers and functioning of the 
board, and to set out matters of policy that the shareholder representative and the board will follow in order to ensure 
good governance.   
 
The Board Charter defines the mission of the board, recites the legal fiduciary responsibilities of board members, 
defines policy relating to board composition and to the selection and orientation of board members, recites legal 
requirements relating to conflicts of interest by board members (including those arising when government officials 
serve as board members), and sets out the board committee structure.  It recites regulatory stipulations for the conduct 
of board meetings, and defines additional policies in that respect.  It emphasizes the role of the board in determining the 
policies and processes necessary to ensure the integrity of internal controls and risk management.  It requires the board 
to adopt a code of conduct defining principles and standards of ethical business practice, and to be responsible and 
accountable for compliance. 
 
The Board Charter requires that the chairperson annually evaluate each board member and the board as a whole, and 
that the board remuneration committee formally evaluate the performance of the CEO semi-annually.  It stipulates that 
the chairperson, in consultation with the CEO, determines a succession plan for the CEO and other key executive 
managers.  Finally, the Charter grants all board members access to any DBSA staff member as required to support 




•  Role of the Chairperson 
Primary responsibility for ensuring the efficient and effective operation of the board falls 
to the chairperson of the board.  The role of the chairperson should be defined in writing 
(for example, in the board charter).  That role should include primary responsibility for 
direct contacts with the shareholder representative, for organizing the work program of 
the board and for setting board meeting agendas, for agreeing with the shareholder 
representative the skills and experience the board should possess to ensure its 
effectiveness, and for ensuring the performance of the CEO and the board itself is 
formally appraised. 
 
•  Board Committees 
A key means by which to promote good board performance is to establish sub-
committees for certain specialized tasks.  Many countries now require that boards 
  16establish at least an audit committee.  Audit committees play an essential role in overall 
corporate governance by ensuring the accuracy, timeliness and relevance of information 
flows.  (The duties of audit committees are described more fully below.) 
 
Some countries, including Australia, Sweden and Norway, now require that the board 
establish a remuneration committee.  Generally, remuneration committees are tasked 
with formally assessing the performance of the CEO and reviewing the performance of 
other key managers, setting remuneration principles, recommending senior management 
remuneration to the board, making recommendations regarding board remuneration to the 
shareholder representative, and ensuring disclosure of principles and actual remuneration. 
 
Boards also often establish a specialized risk management committee.  Generally, risk 
management committees are responsible for ensuring the adequacy of risk management 
policies and management’s adherence to such policies, including specific risk limits. The 
committees explicitly addresses credit, interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and 
operational risk. 
   
All board committees should have a written terms of reference that define their duties, 
authorities, composition and working procedures.  Committees should report to the full 
board, and minutes of committee meetings should be circulated to all board members. 
The Information, Reporting and Disclosure Regime  
Effective corporate governance depends on the flow of accurate, timely and relevant 
information internally within the organization, and externally to the government, 
legislature and public.  This includes internal reporting to management (e.g. management 
information systems – MIS), management reporting to the board, board reporting to the 
shareholder representative, shareholder representative reporting to the government and 
legislature, as well public reporting via the published accounts.  Ensuring adequate 
reporting at all levels requires an investment in accounting and information systems, in 
internal controls, and in internal and external auditing.  It involves formulating and 
documenting policies and procedures, putting in place hardware and software systems, 
and recruiting and training qualified staff, among other tasks.   
 
Key tasks of the board therefore are to ensure a functioning system of internal financial 
and operational control, to monitor disclosure, reporting and public communications 
processes, and to ensure that financial statements and other disclosures fairly present the 
institution’s performance, financial condition, business and risks.
21  The critical nature of 
these tasks, the specialized skills they involve, and the commitment of time and attention 
to detail they require, are among the reasons many countries require boards to establish 
audit committees dedicated to, and accountable for, this work. 
  
•  The Composition and Role of Audit Committee 
The audit committee should have explicit responsibility for oversight of internal and 
external audit functions, for approval, dismissal and compensation of the external 
auditor,
22 for approving the external and internal audit plans, and for reviewing audits 
                                                 
21 Ensuring the accuracy of required reporting to the regulatory and supervisory authorities is also relevant 
in this regard. 
22 Or for recommending approval to the full board, or via the board to the shareholder representative. 
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It should be comprised solely of independent board members who are financially 
literate.
23  The chairperson of the audit committee should not the chairperson of the board.   
The committee should have the authority to meet with any officer of the institution.  It 
should meet annually with the external auditor, routinely with the internal auditor, and 
periodically with the official supervisory authorities.  It also should maintain a dialogue 
with the state’s supreme audit institution (the Auditor-General). 
 
•  The Audit Functions 
The internal audit function, while reporting administratively to executive management, 
should be accountable to the audit committee and have unrestricted access to the 
chairperson of the board and all board members.  It should provide the board an 
independent check and assurance on the information received from senior management 
on the operations, performance and condition of the SFI.  The internal audit function 
should follow an internal audit plan based on a formal risk assessment of the SFI.  
 
The  external audit should be conducted according to international standards.
24  A n  
external audit is both a means and an incentive for the board and management to perform 
their duties professionally.  The external audit provides the board in independent 
assessment of the accuracy of reporting by management, and the state of internal 
financial and operational control.  The audit committee should use clear procedures for 
the selection of the external audit firm, which ensure the firm is independent of 
management and the state (as shareholder), among other criteria.
25  The external audit 
firm should be required to utilize international accounting and auditing standards.   
Among its tasks, the external audit firm should review the internal control processes 
related to the public disclosure of financial statements and other information. 
Section III.  Additional Challenges with Development Institutions  
Overview 
In contrast to SCB, the main objective of which is to maximize profit/value, SDB/DFI are 
expected to pursue public policy mandates as well meet financial performance objectives.  
Fulfilling policy mandates typically involves providing services to targeted groups on 
less than fully commercial terms, for example, granting concessionary loans or providing 
technical assistance and training services at no or low cost to certain clients.
26  Fulfilling 
policy mandates, therefore, can conflict with financial performance objectives and can 
jeopardize long-run financial sustainability unless adequate arrangements are in place for 
compensating SDB/DFI for delivering such services.  On the other hand, financing 
arrangements for policy activities can be misused to cover operational inefficiencies and 
                                                 
23 In general terms, a board member is “independent” when he/she has no direct or indirect relationships or 
interests of a financial, commercial, professional or philanthropic nature which are likely to interfere with 
the quality of their decisions as regards the interests of the firm. 
24 Audits performed by the state supreme audit entity (Auditor General) may mainly focus on the use of 
public funds and budget resources, and generally are not considered a substitute for an external financial 
audit. 
25 It is important to ensure that the independence of the external audit firm is not comprised by non-audit 
work performed by the SFI. 
26 In effect, then, fulfilling policy mandates involves providing some form of subsidy to recipients of 
services. 
  18losses unrelated to policy activities.  Institutionalizing the means by which to make 
tradeoffs between policy and financial objectives and to efficiently fulfill policy 
mandates is a key governance challenge facing SDB/DFI. 
 
As noted in Section I, given their responsibility for potential contingent fiscal liabilities, 
finance ministers are important stakeholders in SFI governance.  In addition, for 
SDB/DFI, it is often finance ministries that bear ultimate responsibility for financing 
policy activities.  For this reason, arrangements such as those set out in Box B are 
particularly important in the context of SDB/DFI governance. 
 
Shareholder representative as well as finance ministers need to create incentives for 
boards and executive managers to effectively and efficiently engage in policy activities 
while meeting financial and operating efficiency performance objectives, and to ensure 
long run financial sustainability without resort to extraordinary state support.  Within the 
context of the basic governance arrangements set out Section II, this can be promoted by 
clearly defining policy mandates and the means by which those mandates are to be 
financed, by requiring that the costs involved in undertaking policy activities be 
quantified and dynamically assessed in the context of overall strategic and financial 
planning, and by requiring that actual performance in achieving policy objectives is 
quantified and assessed, and that costs versus outcomes are periodically evaluated.  
Defining Policy Mandates and Means of Financing 
 
•  Policy Mandates 
SDB/DFI generally have been established by governments as a means to fill perceived 
gaps in financial markets (e.g. lack of sufficient long-term finance, agriculture finance, or 
SME finance).  Yet, in many cases, the nature of these gaps, and in particular their root 
causes, have not been well analyzed or understood, which otherwise would have 
facilitated design of a possibly narrow state intervention to resolve those root causes.  
Instead, it is common for the mandates of policy institutions to be defined in broad and 
general terms, particularly in relevant law (e.g. founding legislation) and implementing 
regulations. 
 
Broad mandates themselves may be a root cause of the problems encountered by many 
SDB/DFI.  They can enable boards and executive management to pursue a wide range of 
businesses beyond those originally envisioned by governments or legislatures.  They can 
make it more difficult to measure board, management and institutional performance.  
 
For these reasons, shareholder representatives and finance ministers should define 
SDB/DFI policy mandates as explicitly and narrowly as feasible. This can be achieved by 
means of tools such as Shareholder Mandates, Corporate Plans and Statements of 
Shareholder Intent discussed in Section II.      
 
The nature of market gaps is by definition dynamic.  The boundaries between what is 
commercially viable and what requires state invention changes with the evolution of the 
financial services industry and the needs of users of financial services.  Periodic Mandate 
Reviews, as described in the Section II, are a good instrument through which to reassess 
the existence of market gaps and to refine the SDB/DFI policy mandates. 
  19 
•  Financing Policy Activities 
In principle, there are several means by which to finance the provision of financial and 
other services on concessionary terms.  In practice, the various means cited below often 
are used in combination.  None are without their drawbacks. 
 
A common means to finance policy activities is to cross-subsidize concessionary 
business with profits from commercial business.  The problem is that cross-subsidization 
creates incentives for managements and boards to expand the commercial activities of the 
institution with the justification that this will enable them to engage in more policy 
activities and/or to offer greater concessions to needy clients.  The effect is often to 
under-price commercial business, to crowd-out the private sector in commercial financial 
markets, and/or to undermine new private entry into those markets and thwart financial 
market development.
27  To mitigate this risk, shareholder representatives and/or finance 
ministries need to ensure internal monitoring and reporting mechanisms are in place to 
make transparent and delimit the commercial activity undertaken by SDB/DFI.  In 
addition to these internal systems, governments can consider to create mechanisms that 
enable the private sector to formally table concerns regarding perceived unfair 
competition from state institutions.  To mitigate the risk of under-pricing by state 
institutions, shareholder representatives can require that certain commercial activity 
financed by SDB/DFI be co-financed and jointly priced by private institutions.
28
 
Another means to finance concessionary business is for the shareholder representative to 
adopt  soft financial performance targets (i.e. allow the institution to earn a below 
market), with the differential between market returns and actual returns allocated to cover 
the cost of policy-related activities.
29  A complement to this approach is to forego 
dividends or to endow the institution with excess capital.  A related means is for the 
government to grant the institution exemptions from income and other taxes, with the 
savings used to financial policy activities.  These type provisions, however, place 
SDB/DFI at a competitive advantage relative to private sector institutions, and again, to 
the extent that they are permitted to engage in commercial activities, can have the effect 
of undermining the private sector and thwarting market development. 
 
Another alternative for financing policy activities is for the government to 
administratively reduce the cost of funds of SDB/DFI.  This can involve guaranteeing 
the institution’s debts, forcing state companies, other financial institutions, or public 
pension funds, to purchase bonds or place deposits with the institution at below market 
rates, or granting soft loans to the institution (e.g. by the central bank).  This method 
represents, in effect, a tax on funds providers which can weaken their finances, distort 
financial markets and set back market development.  Guaranteeing debts of policy 
institutions also weakens the potential for market discipline to be brought to bear on 
management and the board. 
 
                                                 
27 Another result can be that the institution strays far beyond its mandate, takes on far more business and 
risk than is necessary to fulfill its policy mandate, and in the process incurs greater losses or creates greater 
contingent fiscal liabilities for government. 
28 This is particularly feasible in the context of funding large infrastructure projects. 
29 It would not, however, involve allowing the institution to operate at a loss. 
  20Finally, governments can make direct fiscal transfers to compensate SDB/DFI for costs 
incurred in undertaking policy activities.  This method avoids potential market distortions, 
and has the benefit of being more readily quantifiable and transparent.
30  Yet it is not 
without its problems, in that annual fiscal transfers, being subject to the annual budgetary 
process, are less predictable and can impair effective long-term planning by management 
and the board. 
 
Whatever method or combination of methods is employed, effective governance requires 
that the manner in which policy activities will be financed be specified by the 
government or shareholder representative, in consultation with the board.  The goal is to 
agree and make transparent the source of financing for policy activities and to take 
complementary steps to mitigate any potential negative consequences.  Financing 
arrangements should not be subject to frequent change. 
Managing, Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Activities and 
Performance 
With a clear definition of policy mandates and agreement on the means to finance them, 
the shareholder representative is in a position to agree specific policy, financial and 
operational performance targets with the board and executive management.  Policy 
targets  would give more detailed specification to the policy mandate, would be 
expressed as much in possible in quantifiable, measurable terms, including in terms of 
development outcomes.  Financial targets would seek to ensure that the management 
and board assures long-term financial sustainability without potential resort to 
extraordinary government support.  Operational targets would, in effect, seek to ensure 
that compensation for policy activities is passed on to users of financial services or other 
clients and is not absorbed by inefficient operations (excessive costs) or other losses. 
 
See Box G for a description of the means by which the DBSA measures performance and 
balances the tradeoffs inherent in policy activities. 
 
                                                 
30 It also has the benefit of potentially being made available to private institutions. 
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DBSA’s mandate is broadly defined in the DBSA Act and implementing regulations, and is further specified in the 
Shareholder Compact and in the Corporate Plan.  The Shareholder Compact also records key assumptions and 
principles (including that DBSA will remain financially sustainable while delivering development impact, and that a 
certain percentage of its profits will be contributed annually to the DBSA Developmental Fund, its subsidiary which 
provides grants for municipal capacity building).  The Corporate Plan defines DBSA’s strategic goals and objectives, as 
well as performance measures and targets.   
 
Performance measures and targets in the Corporate Plan are articulated using a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
methodology.  The BSC is cascaded from corporate to divisional to unit level.  Divisional and unit level BSCs are an 
important input to their business plans.  The corporate level BSC forms the basis of reporting by the board in the 
Annual Report.  In practice, the shareholder representative defines overall strategic direction, while specific strategic 
objectives and performance measures and targets are proposed by the CEO, executive management and the Board, and 
negotiated and agreed with the shareholder representative.  
 
The BSC is frequently refined.  Recent objectives of these efforts have been to measure development outcomes rather 
than simply outputs, to better quantify the development impact of projects that have been supported financially by 
DBSA, and to quantify qualitative aspects of development impact, such as that resulting from the research and policy 
advice provided by DBSA.  External stakeholders’ views of the value and quality of DBSA work are ascertained 
through surveys conducted by independent third parties. 
 
The current BSC defines a total of 25 performance measures associated with the broad strategic goals and specific 
strategic objectives set out in the Corporate Plan.  Targets are set for each performance measure for the current and next 
two years.  Performance against each target is rated using a standardized point-based system, and ratings are aggregated 
using weights assigned to each performance measure.  Aggregate performance against the corporate level BSC 
determines the annual bonus pool available for staff.  (A separate bonus pool for executive management is determined 
by the BSCs and other factors).  Division and unit BSC performance determines the staff bonus allocation to the unit 
level, though bonuses actually paid to individual staff members are determined by a number of additional factors. 
 
Among the BSC performance measures are volume targets for loan and equity investment commitments and 
disbursements, with an appropriately low aggregate weight of 9%.  By comparison, a new performance measure for the 
volume of grants mobilized to complement investment projects carries a 7% weight.  Other development impact 
measures include the value of loans, grants and equity investments granted to certain historically disadvantaged groups, 
the number of outside persons receiving training in priority skills, and the number of project managers trained and 
deployed to needy municipalities. The DBSA’s mandate to facilitate private sector participation in municipal finance is 
expressed as a measure of the ratio of DBSA funding relative to others’ funding in DBSA funded projects.   Like 
certain other performance measures, the co-funding target ratio (1:1.2) is cascaded to divisions and units in a 
differentiated manner, such that some units (urban infrastructure) have higher target ratios than others (units lending to 
the poorest municipalities).  Other performance measures assess external clients’ satisfaction with DBSA’s delivery on 
its capacity building initiatives, market perceptions of DBSA’s image in the development finance community and its 
research quality, and client and partner satisfaction with the value, quality and relevance of expertise offered by DBSA. 
 
DBSA’s mandate to maintain financial sustainability is expressed in terms of four measures relating specifically to 
financial performance (aggregate 15% weight).  Others measure internal operational performance (e.g. turn-around 
time for project evaluations and decisions, and accuracy and reliability of all operations system data as assessed by 
audit reports – aggregate 18% weight).  Complementary performance measures assess staff satisfaction with the 
knowledge management function (specifically, their ability to readily access and leverage internal knowledge) and the 
ICT (information, communications and technology) function. 
  
A key tool used by DBSA for managing and balancing the tradeoffs in delivering concessionary finance and other 
services to targeted groups, while assuring of financial sustainability, is a detailed financial analysis model run by 
DBSA’s Corporate Finance Division.  This scenario analysis capacity is used to assess the potential impact of policy 
decisions on the bank’s long-run financial performance and sustainability.  The implicit objective inherent in the model 
is to maintain the real value of capital.  The model has been used, for example, to test the viability of the shareholder 
representative’s desire that DBSA direct more funding to infrastructure in poorer municipalities and communities, and 
on more concessionary terms.  The model can be used to assess different pricing policies for developmental activities. 
 
Besides reporting externally on its BSC results, DBSA reports on the non-financial impacts and outcomes of its lending 
utilizing Social Accounting Matrix models (SAM).  The SAMs take into account the linkages of DBSA projects with 
others, such as through the purchase of materials, hiring of workers, etc.  The SAMs are used to estimate the impact of 
DBSA projects on GDP, employment, and low income households. 
 
See: http://www.dbsa.org 
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Section IV.   Detailed Evaluation Framework and Case Study 
In the previous sections this note has highlighted key governance arrangements and 
practices relevant for SFI, including state commercial banks and state financial 
institutions with policy mandates.  In practice, there are many other matters to be 
addressed when putting in place a comprehensive governance regime.  As a means to 
illustrate the potential scope of an exercise, presented below is a case study of the 
governance arrangements at the Development Bank of Southern Africa employing a 
comprehensive framework for assessing SFI corporate governance.  The framework was 
derived from the OECD’s 2005 Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned 
Enterprises, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s report Enhancing 
Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations. 
 
The DBSA was established in 1983 to undertake a broad range of economic development 
functions under South Africa’s homeland constitutional arrangements.  New 
constitutional arrangements were put in place in 1994 and the bank was subsequently 
oriented more narrowly toward infrastructure finance starting in 1996.  The loan portfolio 
relating to other sectors (e.g., agriculture, SMEs) was spun off to other institutions shortly 
thereafter.  The bank was reconstituted under the DBSA Act of 1997 with a mandate to 
provide “financial, technical and other assistance…with a focus in its investments 
activities on infrastructure funding broadly defined and with the object of acting as a 
catalyst to maximize private sector access to opportunities in the provision of public 
funding.”  Today the DBSA falls administratively under the Ministry of Finance and 
forms part of South Africa’s Development Finance System, which also includes the Land 
and Agricultural Development Bank (under the Department of Agriculture), the Industrial 
Development Corporation (Department of Trade and Industry), the National Housing 
Finance Corporation (Department of Trade and Industry), and Khula Enterprise Finance 
Ltd. (for SME finance, under the Department of Trade and  Industry).   
 
The DBSA’s governance arrangements are an example of good practice in many respects.  
They are particularly strong with regard to: i) the specificity of the mandate, ii) the clarity 
with which the respective roles of the owner, board and management are defined, iii) 
board composition, iv) the extent to which commercial principles are embedded in the 
legal and governance arrangements, v) the manner in which its performance objectives 
are set, measured and evaluated, and vi) public reporting and disclosure.   
 
Legislatively, the DBSA is subject not only to the DBSA Act and the implementing 
regulations issued pursuant to the Act, but also to the comprehensive Public Finance 
Management Act (PFM Act).  The PFM Act stipulates detailed rules for financial 
management and reporting to be followed by governing bodies and management of all 
SOEs with the objective to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of 
SOEs.  It promotes this by establishing comprehensive responsibilities for, especially, the 
boards of directors.  It requires the use of generally accepted accounting practices and the 
implementation of sound internal control and risk management systems.  It sets standards 
for budgeting and annual reporting, establishes notification requirements for certain 
transactions, and establishes procedures for borrowing, issuance of guarantees and 
procurement.   
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The DBSA also is subject to the Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector 
issued by the Department of Public Enterprises in 2002, which articulates the respective 
roles and responsibilities of government as shareholder, the board, the chairperson and 
the chief executive for SOEs. The Protocol seeks to amplify, with respect to SOEs, the 
principles set out by the King Committee on Corporate Governance in its Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct of 2002, which distilled the recommendations of a 
number of task teams codifying a range of corporate governance matters under the 
auspices of the Institute of Directors, South Africa.  
 
The Minister of Finance (as shareholder representative) appoints all directors as in 
practice the DBSA board is comprised largely of independent non-executive directors.  
Under policies set out in the Board Charter (an agreement between the shareholder 
representative and the board that is required under the Protocol and was described earlier 
in Box F), the chairperson and CEO are to assist the Minister in identifying potential 
board members, while the Minister extends the invitation to join the Board.   In practice, 
the Minister calls for nominations and consults with the board and other Ministries with a 
stake in DBSA’s operations (e.g., Department of Provincial and Local Government).  The 
board elects its chairperson from among its members, subject to the consent of the 
Minister.   
 
There are a number of arrangements in place to provide clarity regarding the owner’s 
(Minister’s) expectations regarding the role of the board, the ongoing mandate of DBSA, 
and specific performance objectives.  The DBSA Act implementing regulations define 
the duties, responsibilities and powers of the board as well as board procedures.  The 
regulations require that the board appoint an audit committee and a remuneration 
committee.  They specify board recordkeeping requirements (as does the PFM Act).  The 
Board Charter also highlights relevant statutory requirements, documents matters of 
policy that the board and shareholder will follow, and articulates the duties of the board, 
the chairperson and board committees.   
 
The DBSA’s mandate (which was cited above) is defined in the DBSA Act implementing 
regulations (the Act itself sets out main and ancillary objectives).  In addition, the 
National Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the PFM Act  require that the board 
agree annually with the Minister of Finance a Shareholder Compact which further defines 
the objectives of the DBSA.  Under the  PFM Act, the board must submit annually to the 
Minister a Corporate Plan which must document key performance measures against 
which organizational performance is assessed.   (In practice the Corporate Plan is 
annexed to the Shareholder Compact.)  These legal arrangements provide for clear 
delineation of the DBSA’s mandate as well as its public policy objectives.   
 
The DBSA’s financial performance, operating and policy performance are subject to 
extensive evaluation.  Performance measures and targets are set and evaluated annually.  
These were described above in Box G. 
 
The DBSA makes extensive public disclosure of information about its financial, 
operational and policy performance.  As with other key matters of governance, the 
DBSA’s disclosure practices are subject to a number of legal underpinnings.  The DBSA 
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achievement of the objectives” of the DBSA, and requires that DBSA be audited annually 
by persons registered under the Auditing Profession Act.   Under the DBSA Act 
implementing regulations the bank is subject to the Accounting and Disclosure 
requirements of the Companies Act and is required to adhere to South African Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices.   (In practice the DBSA uses the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.)   
The PFM Act requires the board to submit an annual report and audited financial 
statements, based on generally accepted accounting practices, to be tabled before 
Parliament.    
 
In practice, the DBSA publishes an Annual Report that includes the Annual Financial 
Statements including a Director’s Report.  The financial statements are audited by an 
affiliate of an international auditing firm.  In the Annual Report the Minister of Finance 
provides his assessment of the performance of the DBSA and his expectations regarding 
strategic direction and future performance.  The Director’s Report discusses objectives 
and performance in detail, and includes an Economic Report, an Environmental Report 
and a Social Report.  The Economic Report covers, among other matters, the actual 
delivery of products and services and their geographic and business sector focus, and 
reports on the developmental impact of the Bank.  The Environmental Report provides a 
qualitative discussion of the environmental impact of the DBSA’s products and services 
and its own operations.  Similarly, the Social Report provides a qualitative discussion of 
activities and impacts in areas such as human resource development.  The Directors’ 
Report is subject to the external audit to confirm its quantitative and qualitative content.  
The DBSA also has published annually an Activities Report that describes the 
development impact of its activities during the year.
31  All these reports, as well as 
extensive additional information, are available on DBSA’s website (www.dbsa.org).   
 
These are only some of the key highlights of governance practices at the DBSA.  For 
more detail, see Table One, which employs the comprehensive framework for assessing 
SFI corporate governance mentioned above.   
 
                                                 
31 The Activities Report was discontinued in 2007, with its content incorporated into the Annual Report. 
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Corporate Governance Benchmark  Evaluation of DBSA 
1.  Legal and Regulatory Foundations 
The state finance institution (SFI) has clear legal 
form as a corporate entity, either under general 
corporate or banking law, or an institution-specific 
statute.
32  The law stipulates a board of directors as 
a required governance body.
33
DBSA was established in 1983 and is registered 
as a company in terms of the Companies Act 
(1973), although it is not subject to the provisions 
of Companies Act, except as noted below.  DBSA 
was reconstituted under the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa Act (1997).   
The DBSA Act requires DBSA to have a Board 
of Directors. Through its Board, DBSA is 
accountable to the South African government as 
sole shareholder.   
There is clear administrative separation of 
responsibilities within government for exercising 
SFI ownership, and for SFI regulation and 
supervision, setting national industrial policy and 
exercising ownership functions for state industrial 
and other non-financial firms. 
Under the DBSA Act the Minister of Finance is 
authorized to act as owner of the shares held by 
the government.   
Under the Public Finance Management Act
  (PFM 
Act),
34 DBSA and its Board are accountable to 
the Minister of Finance both in his capacity as the 
“executive authority” for DBSA (the Cabinet 
member accountable to Parliament for DBSA) 
and in his capacity as head of the National 
Treasury.
35
DBSA is not subject to regulation or supervision 
by the South African Reserve Bank, though it 
does file certain reports relating to its borrowing 
and currency management policies with SARB.  It 
is subject to regulatory oversight by the Financial 
Services Board
36 and to the Financial Intelligence 
Centre.
37
                                                 
32 Good Practice: Incorporating the SFI under general corporate or banking law can leverage upon the 
governance standards in those laws, may provide greater flexibility to the state to take actions to 
professionalize governance, including through ownership diversification, and will help to establish a more 
level playing field among potentially competing financial institutions. 
33 This is in contrast to non-corporatized SFIs where management may report directly to a ministry. 
34 DBSA: The PFM Act stipulates detailed rules and regulations related to financial management and 
reporting to be followed and observed by SOE governing bodies and management   Its objective is to 
secure transparency, accountability and sound management of public institutions, and promotes this by 
establishing clear and comprehensive responsibilities for especially the boards of directors of public entities.  
The PFM Act is applicable to all public entities including central government SFIs such as DBSA.  Among 
its provisions, the PFM Act requires the use of generally accepted accounting practices, requires internal 
control and risk management systems be in place, sets standards for budgeting and annual reporting, 
establishes notification requirements for certain transactions, and establishes procedures for borrowing, 
guarantees and procurement. 
35 DBSA: In this latter context, DBSA is accountable to the Minister of Finance in the same manner as are 
all South African SFIs and other “national public entities.” 
36 DBSA: The Financial Services Board oversees non-bank financial institutions and promotes investor 
protection. 
37 DBSA: With respect to anti-money laundering legislation. 
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Law and regulation clearly define and delineate the 
roles, responsibilities and authorities of the 
governance bodies (owner, board of directors, 
senior management).
38
The DBSA Act specifies that: i) the 
shareholder(s) exercise overall authority, but may 
delegate to the Board all powers except the power 
to issue and transfer shares, to appoint directors, 
and to approve dividend payments; ii) the Board 
controls the business of DBSA and may exercise 
all power not reserved for the shareholder; iii) the 
CEO is responsible for managing the operations 
of DBSA, and iv) the powers of the Board may be 
delegated to the CEO who may delegate such 
powers to staff. 
The DBSA Act provides that the Minister of 
Finance, at the request of the shareholder or the 
Board, may make regulations (Article 17 
regulations) addressing matters that mostly relate 
to the functions of the governance bodies.  Article 
17 regulations in fact specify requirements for the 
annual general meeting (AGM) of shareholders, 
appointment and disqualification of directors, 
required disclosures by directors in the case of 
potential conflicts of interest, proceedings at 
directors’ meetings, and the power of directors. 
In its Protocol on Corporate Governance in the 
Public Sector (the Protocol), the government has 
articulated the respective roles and 
responsibilities of government as shareholder, the 
board, the chairperson and the chief executive for 
public companies generally.
39
Finally, the PFM Act establishes clear and 
comprehensive responsibilities for the Minister of 
Finance as shareholder representative and for the 
board of directors. 
                                                 
38 Good Practice: Roles, responsibilities and authorities are comparable to those for private financial 
institutions or companies. 
39 DBSA: Protocol on Corporate Governance in the Public Sector, Department of Public Enterprises, 
September 2002, section 5.  The Protocol seeks to amplify, with respect to state-owned enterprises, the 
principles set out by the King Committee on Corporate Governance in 2002 in its Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct.  The King Code distilled the recommendations of a number of task teams codifying 
a range of corporate governance matters under the auspices of the Institute of Directors, South Africa. 
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Law or regulation clearly define the fiduciary 
responsibilities (standards of care, conflicts of 
interest) and liabilities of board members. 
The PFM Act sets out the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the members of the boards of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are 
applicable to the DBSA Board.
40  The Article 17 
regulations make applicable to DBSA all 
principles of the Companies Act.
41  The Protocol 
requires the Board to adopt a Board Charter 
which is explicit that the implication of the 
application to DBSA of the principles of the 
Companies Act is that individual Board members 
carry the same fiduciary responsibilities as do 
directors of a private company.
42  The Article 17 
regulations address situations of Board member 
conflicts of interest.  Detailed rules are set out in 
DBSA’s written Code of Ethics.
43
The PFM Act defines the liabilities of Board 
members.
44  Members can be held individually 
and severally liable for all decisions taken by the 
Board.
45
Law or regulation provides that the owner is able to 
obtain from the SFI all necessary information to 
effectively undertake its ownership responsibilities. 
The PFM Act establishes the responsibility of the 
Board to provide the Minister of Finance, as 
shareholder representative, with all material facts 
which in any way may influence his decisions and 
actions.
46  The Minister has additional power to 
obtain information as head of the National 
Treasury.
47  The DBSA Board has prepared and 
the National Treasury has accepted a Framework 
of Acceptable Levels of Materiality and 
Significance (Materiality Framework) defining 
quantitative and qualitative reporting thresholds.
48
                                                 
40 DBSA: For example, Board members must “exercise the duty of utmost care…”, “act with fidelity, 
honesty, integrity and in the best interests of (DBSA) in managing its financial affairs”, and may not 
“use…confidential information…for personal gain or to improperly benefit another person”.  Board 
members “must disclose…any direct or indirect personal or private business interest that (they)…may have 
in any matter before” the Board, and “must withdraw from the proceedings” of the Board when the matter 
is considered. 
41 DBSA: Article 121. 
42 DBSA: Section 4.3.5.4. of the Protocol requires the board to adopt a charter setting out it responsibilities, 
which are to be disclosed in the Annual Report.  At a minimum, the charter is to confirm the board’s 
responsibility for the adoption of strategic plans, monitoring of operational performance and management, 
determination of policy and processes to ensure the integrity of risk management and internal controls, 
communication policy, and director selection, orientation and evaluation.  With respect to the board charter, 
the Protocol is elaborating upon recommendations in the King Code (King 2.1.17.). 
43 DBSA: The Code of Ethics is required under the Protocol (Section 6.5), elaborating upon 
recommendations of the King Code (King 5.2). 
44 DBSA: Article 83. 
45 DBSA: This point, somewhat ambiguous under the PRM Act, is clarified in the Protocol (5.2.4.). 
46 DBSA: Article 50. (1) (c). 
47 DBSA: The PFM Act provides that the Board must submit to the National Treasury and/or the Auditor-
General any information, returns, documents, explanations and motivations as may be prescribed by them.  
Article 54. (1).  The PFM Act also stipulates requirements for preparation and  submission of financial 
statements.  Article 55. 
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Law or regulation provides for adequate 
transparency and establishes adequate disclosure 
requirements, including standards for accounting 
and auditing. 
The DBSA Act requires the Board to publish an 
annual report “on the financial status and the 
achievement of the objectives” of DBSA.
49  It 
requires that DBSA be audited annually by 
persons registered under the Public Accountants’ 
and Auditors’ Act (now replaced by the Auditing 
Profession Act (2005)).
50  Under the Article 17 
regulations DBSA is subject to the Accounting 
and Disclosure requirements of the Companies 
Act.
51  The PFM Act requires the Board to submit 
an annual report and audited financial statements, 
based on generally accepted accounting practices, 
to be tabled before Parliament.
52  The Article 17 
regulations require DBSA to adhere to South 
African Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices.
53  In fact, DBSA has adopted and uses 
the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board.  See additional details in 
Section 4 (Transparency and Disclosure) below. 
Relevant law or regulation identifies and delimits 
the objectives of the SFI, including the public 
policy objectives of institutions with policy 
mandates.
54   
The DBSA Act defines DBSA’s main objects,
55 
its ancillary objects,
56 and its powers.
57  The 
Article 17 regulations further define the mandate 
of DBSA.
58  The PFM Act requires that the Board 
submit annually to the Minister
59 a Corporate 
Plan which is to document key performance 
measures against which organizational 
performance is assessed.
60  The National Treasury 
regulations issued pursuit to the PFM Act
61 
require that the Board agree annually with the 
Minister of Finance as the executive authority 
(shareholder representative) of DBSA a 
Shareholder Compact which further defines the 
objectives of DBSA.  (In practice the Corporate 
Plan is annexed to the Shareholder Compact.)  
These legal arrangements provide for clear 
delineation of DBSA’s social and public policy 
objectives.  (Details regarding the Shareholder 
Compact and Corporate Plan are discussed in 
section 2, below, which addresses the ownership 
function.)  
                                                                                                                                                 
48 DBSA: The Materiality and Significance Framework is required under the Treasury regulations issued 
pursuant to the PFM Act, Section 28.3. 
49 DBSA: Article 16. (2). 
50 DBSA: Article 16. (3). 
51 DBSA: Article 51. 
52 DBSA: The audited financial statements must also be submitted to the Minister as shareholder’s 
representative, to the National Treasury, and to the Auditor-General.  Article 55. 
53 DBSA: Article 122. 
54 Good Practice: Relevant regulation/law and/or the corporate charter specify the manner in which social 
services are to be conveyed to clients/beneficiaries (e.g., via below market pricing for certain specified 
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The law/regulation provide guidance on how the 
costs associated with the provision of social/public 
services are to be covered.
62
The income tax exemption granted under the 
Income Taxation Act is one key means by which 
DBSA covers the costs of its social/public 
services (developmental activities).  The 
substantial capital base (details provided below in 
this section), on which the DBSA is not asked to 
pay dividends, is the other key means.  
The nature of any state obligations to recapitalize 
and/or to repay the debts of the SFI are specified in 
law.
63
The DBSA Act and the Article 17 regulations 
provide that the Board may require the state to 
provide additional capital under a 
ZAR4,800million callable capital facility.
64
Under the PFM Act, DBSA may not borrow or 
guarantee in such a way that commits the state 
(the National Revenue Fund) unless approved by 
the Minister of Finance.
65  It is clear that DBSA’s 
debts and other obligations are not guaranteed by 
the state.   
                                                                                                                                                 
services for certain specified clients) and the manner in which public policy objectives (e.g. financial sector 
development) are to be achieved. 
55 DBSA: The promotion of economic development and growth, human resources development, 
institutional capacity building, and the support of development projects and programs in the national 
territory of the Republic of South Africa and the national territories of the countries determined by 
regulation.  Article 3. (1). DBSA focuses its investment activities on infrastructure funding, broadly defined, 
with an additional objective of acting as a catalyst to maximize private sector access to opportunities in the 
provision of public funding in the Southern African region.   
56 DBSA: To assist other international, national, regional and provincial initiatives in order to achieve an 
integrated finance system for development, and to assist other institutions (international or national, public 
or private) with the management of specific funds.  Article 3. (2). 
57 DBSA: The DBSA’s powers are very broad and include, with respect to development projects and 
programs: to mobilize wholesale funding; to lend, invest (equity, debt) and underwrite; to own and deal in 
movable and immovable property; to provide guarantees; and to act as agent or trustee. Article 4. 
58 DBSA: “The mandate of the Bank shall be focused on the provision of financial, technical and other 
assistance to achieve the objects of the Bank as provided (in the DBSA Act), with a focus in its investments 
activities on infrastructure funding broadly defined and with the object of acting as a catalyst to maximize 
private sector access to opportunities in the provision of public funding.”  Article 4. 
59 DBSA: In his capacity both as shareholder’s representative and as Minister responsible for the National 
Treasury. 
60 DBSA: Article 52.  The Corporate Plan covers the following three years.  It is submitted to the Minister 
both in his capacity as owner’s representative, and as head of the National Treasury.  
61 DBSA:  Treasury Regulations for Departments, Trading Entities, Constitutional Institutions and Public 
Entities, March 2005, Article 29.2. 
62 Good Practice: Any planned or potential fiscal transfers or other potential calls on fiscal resources are 
explicit and delimited under law or regulation. 
63 Good Practice: Avoid explicit state guarantee of SFI debts, and seek to minimize expectations of implicit 
guarantee.  Resulting potentially higher funding cost can be offset by greater market discipline exerted over 
management performance. 
64 DBSA: The Act and regulations provide a defined mechanism to trigger the callable capital facility which 
is taken into consideration by the international rating agencies that assign credit ratings to certain of 
DBSA’s obligations. 
65 DBSA: Article 66. (2). 
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Relevant laws/regulations do not prohibit the owner 
from adjusting the capital structure of the SFI.  
Of 500,000 ordinary shares authorized, 200,000 
have been issued (ZAR200 million book value).  
The government has, in addition, provided 
permanent (non-repayable), non-interest bearing 
funding of ZAR3,792 million. 
Under the DBSA Act, i) the government may 
transfer its shares to any institutional shareholder 
(including national, international or multilateral 
institutions, but not individuals); ii) the Board has 
the power to raise additional capital, subject to the 
approval of the shareholders, including by calling 
upon shareholder(s) to subscribe additional 
shares; and iii) the Board authorizes the 
declaration of dividends subject to the approval of 
the shareholders.  The Article 17 regulations offer 
additional flexibility to issue new capital. 
Overall, the legal and regulatory framework 
provides for a level playing field between the SFI 
and private and state commercial financial 
institutions.
66
Under the DBSA Act the Bank cannot be wound-
up except by an Act of Parliament.  It is exempt 
from income tax under the Income Tax Act.  It is 
exempt from the Companies Act and the Banks 
Act (1990),
67 although under the DBSA Act the 
Minister of Finance has the power to apply to 
DBSA any provision of the Companies Act or the 
Banks Act not inconsistent with the DBSA Act, 
and has done so via the Article 17 regulations.  In 
addition to the provisions mentioned above, the 
Article 17 regulations apply to DBSA the 
requirements of the Companies Act with respect 
to required accounting records and the provision 
of half yearly accounts to any holder of securities 
issued by DBSA.  While DBSA is not required to 
comply with the prudential bank regulations of 
the South African Reserve Bank, the Article 17 
regulations mandate that it seek to adhere to 
international corporate best practices,
68 and the 
Bank benchmarks itself against other 
development finance institutions internationally.
69  
Finally in this regard, the DBSA Act requires the 
Bank to pursue its objectives by “facilitating the 
participation of the private sector” in its 
development projects and programs.
70
                                                 
66 Good Practice: The SFI is not exempt from laws and regulations applicable to other (private) financial 
institutions (e.g. prudential banking regulation, general contract law, general labor laws, etc.), or any 
extraordinary exemptions are specified in law, well reasoned, and narrowly circumscribed.  The principles 
and means by which the SFI will avoid displacing the private sector is defined in law/regulation and/or 
corporate statute.  As a potential complement, the mandate of development finance institutions includes 
drawing-in the private sector to service new geographic, product/service and/or client markets. 
67 DBSA:  It is relevant in this context that DBSA is prohibited from taking deposits from the general 
public. 
68 DBSA: Article 122. 
69 DBSA: Such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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The SFI’s corporate statutes (charter, articles of 
association, by-laws and/or similar internal 
instruments) are consistent with and reinforce the 
above. 
The Shareholder Compact, Corporate Plan and 
Board Charter are key instruments giving effect to 
the legal and regulatory foundations of DBSA’s 
corporate governance. 
2. Professional Ownership Function 
The shareholder’s representative responsible for 
the exercise of ownership rights for the SFI is 
clearly identified within the state administration.  
Where there is more than one ministry or 
administrative department involved in exercising 
SFI ownership rights, and/or there is more than one 
state-owned SFI in which ownership rights are 
exercised by other ministries or administrative 
departments, there is a clearly identified 
coordinating entity that serves to harmonize and 
coordinate the actions and policies undertaken by 
different ownership departments in the various 
ministries.
71    
The sole shareholder is the government of the 
Republic of South Africa.  The Minister of 
Finance represents the shareholder’s interests.  
One ministry with a close interest in the activities 
of DBSA, the Ministry of Provincial and Local 
and Government, is represented on the DBSA 
Board, but does not have a direct role in the 
ownership function. 
The Minister of Finance does not serve as 
representative of the state’s shareholding in the 
other South African SFIs.
72  However, the 
Minister of Finance and the National Treasury 
function to a significant extent as the coordinating 
entity for all SFIs (and other SOEs) under the 
provisions of the PFM Act. 
                                                                                                                                                 
70 DBSA: Article 3. (1) (c).  This provision is interpreted as requiring DBSA to “crowd-in” the private 
sector, and in practice it nearly always cofinances projects with private sector financial institutions. 
71 Good Practice: The ownership function for all central government owned SFIs is centralized in a single 
ownership entity that is clearly identifiable within a single ministry (i.e. clear departmental and individual 
responsibility for functioning as the ownership entity), or is a stand-alone entity reporting to the 
administration (and legislature).  The interests of ministries with a direct stake in the performance of the 
SFI(s) are represented and integrated within this ownership entity, and exert influence on the SFI(s) only 
through this entity.  Relevant responsibilities within the ownership entity (departments, individuals) are 
clear. 
72 DBSA:  The other South African SFIs and their shareholder representatives are: Land and Agricultural 
Development Bank (Department of Agriculture), Industrial Development Corporation (Department of 
Trade and Industry), National Housing Finance Corporation (Department of Trade and Industry), and 
Khula Enterprise Finance (Department of Trade and  Industry).  All are development finance institutions. 
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The government has defined an ownership policy 
that defines the overall objectives of SFI 
ownership, the state’s role in SFI governance, and 
how its ownership policy will be implemented. The 
ownership policy has been publicly disseminated, 
and has not been subject to frequent change. 
The PFM Act serves to define important elements 
of the state’s ownership policy, in that it 
establishes comprehensive foundations for the 
prudent operations of state entities and for 
transparency.  In addition, the Protocol provides 
comprehensive guidance on corporate governance 
standards for SOEs.  The principles set out in that 
document are framed as being a cornerstone of 
the government’s overall strategic vision for 
SOEs, and explicitly apply to DBSA and the other 
South African SFIs.  With respect specifically to 
DBSA, the Shareholder Compact further defines 
the state’s ownership policy. 
The shareholder’s representative exercises 
ownership functions mainly by i) participating and 
voting in shareholders’ meetings, ii) electing and 
removing board members, iii) obtaining 
information from the SFI (and others) necessary to 
monitor and evaluate the board, management and 
the SFI, and iv) approving extraordinary 
transactions.
73
Under the DBSA Act the Minister of Finance is 
empowered to vote the state’s shares in 
shareholders’ meetings and to appoint all 
directors.  As noted in section 1, above, the PFM 
Act gives authority to the Minister of Finance, 
both as shareholder representative and as head of 
the National Treasury, to obtain any necessary 
information from the Board and DBDA.  (More 
detail on these points is provided later in this 
section.)  Under the PFM Act the DBSA Board 
must notify the Minister before undertaking 
certain transactions (although, under the Act, the 
Minister may exempt DBSA from this 
requirement).
74
The Minister of Finance, as shareholder 
representative, also exercises ownership functions 
by means of regular meetings with the Board 
Chairperson and the CEO.  These meetings have a 
standing agenda including discussions on the 
Bank’s performance.  They are a key input to the 
Minister’s evaluation of the performance of the 
Bank, the Chairperson, the Board and the CEO.  
Records of the meetings are maintained in the 
same manner as other Board documents. 
The National Treasury, under the PFM Act, 
scrutinizes the Bank’s Corporate Plan and the 
borrowing program therein, and ensures the Bank 
complies with the Materiality Framework. 
                                                 
73 Good Practice: The ownership entity’s ability to issue direction in regard to the board’s day-to-day 
activities is in writing and subject to clear limits. 
74 DBSA: The transactions include establishment of a company, acquisition or disposal of a significant asset 
or shareholding in a company, and commencement or cessation of a significant business activity.  Article 
54.  This provision is further interpreted by the Framework of Acceptable Levels of Materiality and 
Significance cited in section 1.  
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The shareholder representative’s staff is competent, 
composed of individuals with relevant legal, 
financial, economic and managerial expertise.  It 
has the resources and power to hire outside 
expertise when required. 
Staff of the National Treasury function in this 
capacity.  The Treasury has assigned specific 
Chief Directorates to execute specific 
responsibilities for oversight of the Bank.  In 
addition, the Treasury has a dedicated Chief 
Directorate to oversee PFM Act compliance and 
related matters in public entities.  The Minister 
has advisers and has access to independent 
external expertise if required. 
The shareholder’s representative publicly reports 
on its performance in exercising state ownership 
and achieving state objectives.  It is held 
accountable for its performance in exercising the 
ownership function.
75  
The Minister of Finance is accountable to 
Parliament for his performance as shareholder 
representative under the DBSA and PFM Acts.  
The Minister tables the Bank’s Annual Report 
before Parliament.  He makes separate 
presentations on DBSA’s performance to 
Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts and to its Select Committee on Finance. 
In addition, the Auditor-General annually presents 
a report to Parliament on all public entities 
(including DBSA). 
Instances where the shareholder’s representative 
must seek from the legislature ex ante approval of 
decisions (e.g., significant changes in the ownership 
policy, decisions on significant investments or 
divestments) are explicitly and publicly specified. 
In the PFM Act the legislature has defined the 
specific actions and decisions requiring 
notification to and prior approval by the 
responsible Cabinet minister, as well as ex ante 
notification to the National Treasury.
76  As noted, 
these PFM Act provisions are subject to and 
interpreted by the Materiality Framework. 
The shareholder’s representative’s relationships 
with other state bodies (e.g., financial sector 
regulators and supervisors, state supreme audit 
institution) are well defined and not ambiguous. 
Responsibilities are well defined and there is no 
ambiguity.  The SARB (central bank) has no 
involvement in the ownership function.  The 
relationship between the Minister of Finance as 
shareholder representative and the Auditor-
General is governed by the PFM Act.  The 
Auditor-General has the legal authority under the 
Public Audit Act (2004) to audit DBSA, but does 
not do so, relying instead on the professional 
external audits commissioned by the Board.
77 The 
Public Prosecutor has the right to investigate the 
Bank under the Public Prosecutor Act (1994). 
                                                 
75 Usually by representative legislative bodies such as the Parliament or Congress (specified in OECD). 
76 DBSA: Article 55 
77 DBSA: This is in contrast to some other South African SFIs.   For example, the Auditor-General audits 
the Land Bank, and is the auditor of account for Land Bank’s Annual Report. 
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The shareholder’s representative employs a 
structured process to identify, nominate and elect 
board members, subject to explicit policies and 
guidelines.
78  Policies and guidelines are consistent 
with ability of the board to exercise its 
responsibilities in an independent manner.  
Competence and experience requirements are 
explicit and consistent with the strategy and 
business of the SFI.
79
Under the DBSA Act: i) the Board consists of 
from 10 to 15 members; ii) the Minister of 
Finance appoints all directors;
80 iii) Board 
members are appointed “on the grounds of their 
ability and experience in relation to socio-
economic development, development finance, 
business, finance, banking and administration;” 
iv) the Board elects the Chairperson from among 
its members, subject to the consent of the 
shareholders, and; v) Board members hold office 
for three years but are eligible for reappointment.  
Under policies set out in the Board Charter, the 
Chairperson and CEO normally assist the 
Minister in identification of potential Board 
members and the Minister extends the invitation 
to join the Board.
81  In practice, the Minister calls 
for nominations and consults with the Board and 
other Ministries with a stake in DBSA’s 
operations.  The Cabinet has final approval 
authority. 
Board members have finite terms.  Terms are 
staggered. 
Board members have three year terms and are 
rotated on that basis.  Terms are staggered. 
The number of board members who serve as a 
representative of the shareholder’s representative 
or are employees of the coordinating entity (or are 
other state officials or representatives of political 
constituencies) is restricted by policy and limited in 
practice. 
The Protocol stipulates that a majority of Board 
members be independent.  In practice, only three 
government officials are Board members, serving 
as representatives of their ministry/office (the 
Office of the President of South Africa, the 
National Treasury, and the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government).  The National 
Treasury official implicitly represents the 
Minister but does not have any extraordinary role 
at the board. 
                                                 
78 Good Practice: The ownership entity is given sole responsibility for organizing the state’s participation 
in the nomination process.  Consultations with other major shareholders are held in advance of the general 
meeting of shareholders at which board members are elected. 
79 Good Practice: Competence and experience requirements are informed by the annual evaluation of the 
board and board members.  See section  1.C. below addressing Board of Directors. 
80 DBSA: Should other shareholders exist, the Minister appoints the number of directors proportional to the 
government’s share ownership. 
81 DBSA: The Board Charter also defines relevant considerations to guide identification of potential Board 
members. 
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Board members who are employees and/or 
representatives of the shareholder’s representative 
or the coordinating entity (or are other state 
officials or representatives of political 
constituencies) have the same duties and 
responsibilities as other board members, including 
to act solely in the interests of the SFI and all its 
shareholders. The respective state versus personal 
capacity and liability of such board members are 
clear. 
Neither the PFM and DBSA Acts nor the Board 
Charter provides for any distinction with respect 
to responsibilities and duties (or otherwise) as 
between non-executive independent members and 
representative members.  All Board members 
have personal liability for their conduct.  The 
Bank’s directors’ personal liability insurance 
covers all Board members.  
The state, the shareholder’s representative or the 
coordinating entity have adopted disqualification 
guidelines applicable to board members.
82
Under the DBSA Act no person may be a Board 
member if they are: i) disqualified to serve as a 
director under the Companies Act (1973); or ii) 
are a member of any legislature or executive 
council in the Republic, or of a similar 
government institution in the region.  The PFM 
Act defines conditions under which a Board 
member may be dismissed or suspended.
83  The 
Protocol provides that a Board member may be 
disqualified for legal disability, insolvency, 
misconduct, or a criminal record,
84 and defines 
the grounds for Board member dismissal.
85
The shareholder’s representative determines board 
member remuneration,
86 which is sufficient to 
attract individuals with the requisite knowledge, 
skills and experience, and is not driven by short-
term performance. 
The Article 17 regulations provide that Board 
members’ remuneration shall be approved at the 
AGM, and that the Board’s Remuneration 
Committee considers Board (and senior 
management) remuneration.  In practice, the 
Remuneration Committee benchmarks Board 
member remuneration against the private sector 
and other development finance institutions and 
recommends remuneration to the Minister.  The 
Minster determines and approves remuneration in 
line with guidelines for remuneration of directors 
in public entities.  The Chairpersons of the Board 
and its committees are paid a monthly retainer.  
Otherwise, Board members are paid meeting 
attendance fees and expenses incurred on account 
of the Bank’s business.  Remuneration is at a 
level necessary to attract and retain members with 
the requisite skills. 
                                                 
82 Good Practice: Potential board members are subject to standards and background investigations 
comparable to those required for listed companies and under the commercial bank law. 
83 DBSA: Article 83. (4). 
84 DBSA: Section 5.1.10. 
85 DBSA: Section 5.1.6.3. 
86 Likely in consultation with the board chairperson and the board remuneration committee. 
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The shareholder’s representative has ensured the 
size of the board is appropriate to its circumstances 
and is not unduly large. 
The Board has 15 members, including one 
executive (the CEO) three government 
representatives (as noted above), and eleven 
independent directors. At 15, the Board is at its 
maximum size under law.  As part of the annual 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Board, 
Board size (and composition) is explicitly 
assessed. 
The shareholder’s representative has communicated 
overall expectations to the board, including the 
board’s long term mission/mandate, overall board 
responsibilities and duties, the role of the board 
chairperson, which specialized board committees 
should exist, and recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements. 
As noted above, the mandate of DBSA is defined 
by the DBSA Act (main and ancillary objectives) 
and the Article 17 regulations.  The Article 17 
regulations define the duties, responsibilities and 
powers of the Board, and Board procedures.  
They require that the Board appoints an audit 
committee and a remuneration committee.  They 
specify Board recordkeeping requirements (as 
does the PFM Act).  The Board Charter further 
serves to highlight relevant statutory 
requirements, to document matters of policy that 
the Board and shareholder must follow in order to 
ensure good corporate governance, and to 
articulate Board duties, as well as those of the 
Chairperson and the Board committees. 
The shareholder’s representative has communicated 
specific financial and non-financial objectives to 
the board (and management).
87  Objectives are 
prioritized and publicly issued.  Objectives are set 
by the shareholder’s representative or the 
coordinating entity, in consultation with the state 
and the SFI board.  The objectives are formally 
endorsed annually by the general meeting of 
shareholders, the board and management. 
The Shareholder Compact, a formal agreement 
between the Board and the shareholder 
representative, serves to document government’s 
policy and strategic objectives as well as key 
performance measures and indicators to be 
attained by the Bank.
88  The Corporate Plan, 
annexed to the Shareholder Compact, elaborates 
upon agreed objectives, performance indicators 
and quantitative targets. In addition, the Minister 
is able to communicate overall expectations via 
his periodic meetings with the Board chairperson 
and CEO. 
In practice, the strategic objectives and 
performance measures and targets largely are 
proposed by the CEO, executive management and 
the Board and agreed with the Minister as 
shareholder representative. They form the basis of 
reporting by the Directors on performance against 
specific financial and non-financial objectives in 
the Annual Report and in other reports.  See 
details in section 4.  
                                                 
87 Good Practice: Financial objectives include at least after-tax return on equity, productivity objectives 
(e.g. costs relative to various measures of output), loan loss provisioning and related targets, and dividend 
requirements.  Non-financial objectives include to avoid distorting markets or displacing private financial 
activity. 
88 DBSA: The Shareholder Compact is signed by the Minister of Finance (as representative of the 
shareholder), the Chairperson of the Board (on behalf of DBSA), a representative of the Office of the 
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The shareholder’s representative and the board 
have agreed the manner in which the costs of 
undertaking activities on concessionary terms  are 
to be covered (e.g. internal cross-subsidization 
coupled with lower or no dividend payments, direct 
fiscal transfers, etc.).
89  
As noted in section 1, the income tax exemption 
and the large capital contribution by the 
shareholder on which, in addition, no dividends 
are required to be paid, serve as the key means by 
which DBSA’s developmental activities are 
funded.  The Shareholder Compact records 
relevant assumptions, including that DBSA will 
remain financially sustainable while delivering 
developmental impact, that the income tax 
exemption will be maintained, and that a certain 
percentage of profits will be contributed annually 
to the DBSA Developmental Fund, DBSA’s sole 
subsidiary, which provides grants for, and 
otherwise is engaged in, municipal and 
community capacity building.
90  Periodic fiscal 
transfers are not required nor contemplated. 
The shareholder’s representative has specified 
reporting requirements that provide necessary, 
accurate, timely information that enables it to 
routinely monitor SFI activity and assess its 
financial and non-financial performance and 
financial situation. 
Reporting requirements are specified in the PFM 
Act and in the Companies Act provisions that 
have been applied to  DBSA.  The Protocol 
requires the Board to submit to the Minister, as 
shareholder representative, a budget (defined), 
Corporate Plan (defined) and borrowing plans, at 
least one month before the beginning of a new 
financial year.
91  The Shareholder Compact 
addresses requirements for regular and 
extraordinary reporting.  In practice the Bank 
makes quarterly reports to the National Treasury, 
and responds to ad hoc requests by Treasury on 
matters concerning the Bank’s operations and 
performance.  See section 4. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Minister of Finance (on behalf of the National Treasury), as well as by the CEO and the Chairman of the 
Audit Committee of the Board. 
89 Good Practice: The ownership entity has agreed with the board the manner in which the cost of 
undertaking any non-commercial activities (fulfilling policy mandates by providing loans and other 
services on concessionary terms) are to be measured and reported. 
90 DBSA: The mission of DBSA Development Fund is to capacitate municipalities and communities for 
effective service delivery and local economic development in poorly resourced areas and improve the 
quality of lives.” Its specific objective is to address development failure by building capacity to manage 
development initiatives at various levels, particularly in the poorer local governments. 
91 DBSA: Section 5.2.5. 
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The shareholder’s representative utilizes a clear 
evaluation methodology to access SFI performance 
in meeting its financial and non-financial 
objectives.
92
Under the terms of the Shareholder Compact, the 
DBSA utilizes a Balanced Scorecard 
methodology to measure and report upon its 
performance against strategic and business unit 
objectives.
93  The Balanced Scorecard utilizes 
four perspectives: sustainable development 
impact (e.g. new loans approved, new customers 
acquired, new products launched, new technical 
assistance engagements), financial sustainability, 
effective business processes, and learning and 
growth.  The Bank also reports on the non-
financial impacts and outcomes of its lending 
utilizing a Social Accounting Matrix 
methodology.  See more detail in section 4.  
The SFI is subject to external audit, and the 
shareholder’s representative or the coordinating 
entity maintains a regular dialogue with the external 
auditors,
94 consistent with relevant law and with the 
role of the board’s audit committee. 
DBSA is subject to an annual professional 
external audit (see details in section 3 below).  As 
noted, the Treasury has a dedicated Chief 
Directorate to oversee PFM Act compliance and 
related matters in public entities, including those 
related to the external audit.  In addition, the 
Auditor-General evaluates the work of the 
external auditors..   
The shareholder’s representative requires the board 
to prepare an annual Directors’ Report to 
accompany the annual financial statements.
95
The Protocol defines the required content of the 
annual Directors’ Report.
96  The Directors’ 
Report is an integral component of DBSA’s 
Annual Report, and conforms to the Protocol 
requirements.  The Directors’ Report is based on 
the objectives and key performance measures and 
indicators set out in the Shareholder Compact and 
the Corporate Plan.  The Annual Report also 
includes a short report by the Chairperson of the 
Board and additional reporting by management 
regarding strategy, organization, and 
performance.  (See section 4.)   
                                                 
92 Good Practice: Benchmarking against comparable firms is used to evaluate SFI performance (e.g., with 
respect to productivity and efficient use of labor, assets and capital). 
93 DBSA: The Balanced Scorecard methodology is DBSA’s a principal tool for managing and monitoring 
the implementation of its strategy.  
94 This regular dialogue could take the form of routine exchanges of information, meetings or ad hoc 
discussions when problems arise. 
95 Good Practice: The Director’s Report gives information and comment on the organization, financial and 
social/developmental performance, material risk factors, significant events, relations with stakeholders, and 
the effects of direction from the owner. 
96 DBSA: Section 5.1.15.1. 
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The shareholder’s representative encourages the 
SFI to obtain a credit rating and to raise funds in 
the public debt markets.
97
DBSA has obtained a credit rating from three 
international credit rating agencies: Fitch (long 
term debt): AAA; Moody’s (foreign currency 
issuer rating): Baa1; S&P’s: BBB.  It raises 
funding in the domestic capital markets.  Funding 
from international markets are sourced solely 
from multilateral or bilateral development 
institutions. 
Where applicable, the shareholder’s representative 
has publicly issued guidelines regarding the 
equitable treatment of minority shareholders. 
No minority shareholders at this time.  The DBSA 
Act and the Article 17 regulations make 
provisions for potential other shareholders. 
The shareholder’s representative or the 
coordinating entity publishes an annual report on 
its performance, addressing i) SFI performance, 
financial situation and value, ii) how the state has 
implemented its ownership policy, iii) the 
organization and functioning of the ownership 
entity, iv) changes in SFI board composition, and v) 
other relevant information.
98
As noted above, the Minister tables the Bank’s 
Annual Report before Parliament and makes 
presentations on DBSA’s performance to two 
Parliamentary committees.  While no annual 
report by the ownership function, per se, is 
published, the public reporting by DBSA 
addresses much of the benchmark content.  
Similarly, there is no consolidated reporting on 
the performance of the portfolio of state SFIs as a 
group.  The Auditor-General does present 
annually to Parliament a consolidated report on 
the overall performance of all public entities as a 
portfolio, including the SFIs.  
3.  The Board of Directors 
Board members meet an explicit standard of 
independence.
99  The board is comprised mainly of 
independent, non-executive, members who have 
relevant competence and experience.
100
A majority of the Board is composed of 
independent members drawn from the private 
sector.  Only one member of the Board is 
executive (the CEO).  Explicit guidelines and 
procedures are in place (e.g. in the Board Charter) 
to help ensure that the members all have relevant 
competence and experience. 
                                                 
97 Good Practice: A credit rating by an international agency is obtained, and funds are raised in 
international markets. 
98 Best Practice: The annual reporting is part of a report on the aggregate performance of all state-owned 
financial institutions. 
99 Good Practice: Independent directors are defined as members who are not a representative of the owner, 
have not been employed by the SFI in any executive capacity for the preceding three years (and are not an 
immediate relative of such a person), are not professional advisors to the SFI (other than as a board 
member), are not significant suppliers to, or customers of, the SFI, and have no significant contractual 
relationships with the SFI. 
100 Good Practice: The majority of independent non-executive members are from the private sector. 
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Board members have, in effect, the same 
responsibilities and liabilities as under company 
law.  Board responsibilities, articulated in relevant 
legislation and regulation and further elaborated by 
the shareholder’s representative or the coordinating 
entity, are reinforced by the SFI’s statutes.  Board 
members have an explicit obligation to act in the 
best interests of the SFI and all shareholders.  All 
board members have the same obligations and 
liabilities.
101
As noted, board responsibilities are set out clearly 
in the DBSA and PFM Acts and the Article 17 
regulations, and are reinforced in the Shareholder 
Compact and the Board Charter.  All members 
have the same obligations and liabilities.  
All Board members have access to the advice and 
services of DBSA’s Corporate Secretary whose 
functions are in line with those prescribed in the 
Companies Act, including providing guidance to 
Board members on their responsibilities and 
liabilities.
102
Board duties are explicit and include i) to help 
formulate, to approve and to monitor the SFI’s 
strategy, in the context of objectives defined by the 
state and its ownership entity, including balancing 
the tradeoffs inherent in achieving social/public 
policy objectives while adhering to sound business 
principles; ii) to approve key policies; iii) to ensure 
a functioning system of internal financial and 
operational controls is in place; iv) to establish 
performance indicators and benchmarks; v) to 
monitor disclosure and public communications 
processes to ensure financial statements and other 
disclosures fairly present SFI performance, 
financial condition, business, and risks; vi) to 
evaluate management performance, and; vii) to 
develop a succession plan for key managers.   
Board responsibilities are explicit, including in 
law, regulation, the Shareholder Compact and the 
Board Charter, and are generally in accord with 
those set out in the King Code.
103   
As noted in section 2, in the context of shaping 
the Shareholder Compact the Board has a 
significant role in defining strategy.  It approves 
all key policies.
104  Under the PFM Act the Board 
is accountable for DBSA’s management of risk 
and for the systems of internal financial and 
operational controls.
105  It evaluates management 
performance.  The Chairperson determines, in 
consultation with the CEO, a succession plan for 
the CEO and for executive management.
106
                                                 
101 Good Practice: The board has a charter which sets out its responsibilities and liabilities, and which is 
disclosed in the annual report.  
102 DBSA: More specifically, these functions include, among others, providing Board members collectively 
and individually with guidance as to their duties, responsibilities and powers; making Board members 
aware of all law and legislation relevant to the  DBSA, and; ensuring that minutes of all shareholders' 
meetings, Board' meetings and Board committee meeting are properly recorded. 
103 DBSA: The Bank has formally assessed and documented its adherence to the King Code. 
104 DBSA: The Board has approved the following policies: treasury counterparty limits, interest rate risk, 
approved financial instruments, foreign currency risk, liquidity risk, single obligor limits, equity/quasi-
equity limits, investment in third-party managed funds, country exposure limits, capital adequacy, loans 
loss provisioning, exposure to high-risk clients, core vs. non-core funding limits, loan risk spread and 
pricing, security for loans, country risk pricing, compliance framework, and reputation risk framework. 
105 DBSA: Article 51.(1).  Among its explicit responsibilities for risk management, as articulated in the 
Annual Report (pg. 48), are to oversee the whole risk management process, to establish risk strategy 
policies (in liaison with the CEO and senior management), to determine DBSA’s appetite for risk as 
expressed in risk management policies, to approve risk management policies, to ensure DBSA has 
implemented effective processes to proactively manage risk exposures, to ensure use of adequate systems 
of risk management and internal control.  Per the Annual Report (pg. 42), control systems include clearly 
defined lines of accountability and delegation of authority, and provide for full reporting and analysis 
against approved budgets and adherence to policies, processes and guidelines.  Executive management is 
explicitly accountable for determining the adequacy, extent and operation of these systems. 
106 DBSA: Per the Board Charter. 
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The board has an agreed procedure under which a 
member may, if considered necessary, solicit 
independent professional advice at the expense of 
the SFI. 
Board members have the ability to request advice 
from outside parties at the expense of DBSA. 
The board maintains a formal orientation program 
that familiarizes incoming directors with the SFI’s 
operations, senior management and business and 
regulatory environment, and that ensures they are 
aware of the duties, responsibilities and potential 
liabilities.  Board members have access to training 
to ensure their ongoing financial literacy and to 
enable them to stay abreast of relevant legal, 
regulatory and business developments. 
The orientation of new Board members is 
addressed in the Board Charter.  Within 30 days 
of appointment new Board members are provided 
an induction program, including a description of 
their fiduciary duties and an orientation to the 
business and operations of the Bank.  The annual 
effectiveness review of the Board (see more 
below) serves to identify training needs, and 
training programs are provided in response to 
identified needs.  Board training is a line item in 
the annual budget.  
The board has the authority to appoint and dismiss 
the CEO and other key senior managers.
107 It has 
adopted transparent rules and procedures for 
nominating and appointing the CEO, based on 
professional criteria.  Any role of, or agreements 
with, the shareholder’s representative or the 
coordinating entity (or other state bodies) with 
respect to the appointment and dismissal of the 
CEO or other senior managers are publicly 
disclosed.  The performance of the CEO is 
evaluated annually. 
Under DBSA Act, the Minister has the power to 
appoint the CEO, unless the power is delegated to 
the Board.  The power has not been delegated to 
the Board.   As noted above, under the Board 
Charter the Chairman has an explicit role is CEO 
succession. 
The CEO is not the board chairperson.
108 The Chairperson is an independent non-executive 
director. 
The role of the chairperson is clearly defined. It 
includes responsibility for direct contacts with the 
shareholder’s representative or the coordinating 
entity, for ensuring the efficient and effective 
operation of the board,
109 for agreeing with the 
shareholder’s representative or the coordinating 
entity the skills and experience the board should 
possess to ensure its effectiveness, and for ensuring 
the performance of the CEO is formally appraised 
annually. 
The role of the Chairperson of all public entities 
is specified in the Protocol, which addresses the 
benchmark elements.
110  The role of the 
Chairperson is further specified in the Board 
Charter, and includes assisting the shareholder in 
identifying potential Board members, annually 
proposing the assignment of Board members to 
Board committees, setting the agenda for and 
managing Board meetings, reporting annually to 
the shareholder on the performance of each Board 
member and the Board collectively, and 
determining a succession plan for the CEO and 
executive management, among other defined 
tasks.  
                                                 
107 Although perhaps in consultation with, or with the concurrence of, the shareholder’s representative or 
the coordinating entity, especially where the state is the sole shareholder. 
108 Good Practice: The chairperson is an independent, non-executive board member.  
109 Including by setting the agenda for board meetings and prioritizing among agenda items, by distributing 
the workload to board committees, by ensuring all board members are fully involved and informed of any 
decision that has to be taken, and by ensuring that board members remain aware of their responsibilities. 
110 DBSA: Section 5.1.2 
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The board has formed specialized committees for, 
at least, audit, risk management and remuneration.  
Each committee has a written terms of reference 
that defines its duties, authority, composition and 
working procedures.  Committees report to the full 
board, and minutes of committee meetings are 
circulated to all board members.
111
Under the DBSA Act, the Board determines 
which committees to establish, the functions of 
the committees, and the procedures for electing 
chairpersons of committees.  Under the Article 17 
regulations, the Board is required to establish an 
audit committee and a remuneration committee.  
Both committees must have at least three 
members, the majority of which must be non-
executive. 
Until recently the Board maintained an Audit and 
Finance Committee, a Credit Committee, a 
Remuneration Committee and a Knowledge 
Strategy Committee.
112  In 2005, in response to 
the Treasury regulations issued pursuit to the 
PFM Act which prescribe a specialized and 
focused mandate for audit committees, the Audit 
and Finance Committee was split.  The Audit, 
Finance and Credit Committees have 
responsibilities for risk management within 
DBSA 
All committees have written terms of reference 
that are reviewed annually.  All committees are 
chaired by independent non-executive Board 
members.  Minutes and resolutions of Board 
committee meetings are tabled at the subsequent 
Board meeting. 
                                                 
111 Good Practice: Board committees are chaired by independent non-executive board members.  At least, 
the majority of committee members, if not all, are non-executive. 
112 DBSA: The first three Board committees are addressed in the body of this section.  The Knowledge 
Strategy Committee consists of four members.  Its primary purpose is knowledge management, human 
capital transformation and human resources development. 
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The audit committee is responsible for oversight of 
internal and external audit functions, for approving 
the external auditor,
113 for compensation and 
dismissal of the external auditor, for approving the  
external audit scope and frequency and the internal 
audit plan, for reviewing audits and ensuring 
management takes appropriate action in response to 
identified deficiencies.  All committee members are 
non-executive and financially literate.  The 
Chairperson is an independent, non-executive 
member and not the Chairperson of the board.
114  
The committee has the authority to meet with any 
SFI officer.  It meets annually with the external 
auditor, routinely with the internal auditor, and 
periodically with the official supervisory 
authorities.  It maintains a dialogue with the state 
supreme audit institution. 
The Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the 
PFM Act require public entities to have an audit 
committee and specify detailed requirements for 
committee composition and responsibilities.
115  
Under the Article 17 regulations the audit 
committee is responsible to the Board i) for 
reviewing financial statements and accounting 
policies, ii) for the effectiveness of management 
information systems, other systems of internal 
control, and the audit function, and iii) to deal 
with the auditor’s findings. 
The Audit and Finance Committee has six 
members, four of which are non-executive.  The 
chair is an independent non-executive member.  A 
Finance and Risk Management (sub)Committee 
reports to the Audit and Finance Committee.  A 
Fraud Management (sub)Committee reports to the 
Finance and Risk Management (sub)Committee.   
The Audit and Finance Committee evaluates the 
audit policy and audit plan, evaluates 
management processes with respect to internal 
control, recommends appointment of the external 
auditors to the Board, manages and evaluates the 
external auditors, considers significant matters 
arising from the external audit, and reviews and 
evaluates management’s comments on internal 
and external audit reports.
116  (As noted, the 
Audit and Finance Committee was recently split 
to form two separate committees, in part to 
sharpen the focus of the committees.)  Committee 
members have the authority to meet with any 
officer.
117
The Chairperson of the Audit Committee has 
unrestricted access and reports to the Minister of 
Finance, as Shareholder representative.
118  Should 
any report from the internal or external auditors or 
any other source implicate any Board member, 
the Chairperson of the Audit Committee has a 
statutory obligation to report to the National 
Treasury and the Auditor-General.
119  The Audit 
Committee meets with the Auditor-General 
annually. 
In 2003 the DBSA established an independent 
compliance function headed by the Group 
Compliance Officer who has direct access to the 
CEO and the Chairpersons of the Board and its 
Audit and Finance Committee.
120  In 2005 the 
DBSA finalized a group-wide compliance 
strategy and adopted a group compliance manual. 
                                                 
113 Or for recommending to the board, shareholder’s representative, coordinating entity or ownership entity 
for its approval. 
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The board causes the SFI to employ a professional, 
independent external audit firm.
121  The board or its 
audit committee has established clear procedures 
for the selection of the audit firm, which ensures 
the firm is independent of management and the 
state (as shareholder), among other criteria.
122 The 
audit firm utilizes international accounting and 
auditing standards.  The audit firm reviews internal 
control processes related to the public disclosure of 
financial statements. 
Under the Article 17 regulations the Board shall 
recommend annually to the Minister of Finance, 
as shareholder representative, the appointment of 
the external auditors, at remuneration that the 
Board determines. 
The 2005/06 financial statements
123 were audited 
by KPMG Inc, and Gobodo, Inc., both Registered 
Accountants and Auditors in South Africa, in 
accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing, the South African Statements of  
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice, and the 
Accounting and Disclosure requirements of the 
Companies Act, as well as other reporting 
requirements in the PFM Act.   
The board ensures the SFI has a professional 
internal audit function that reports directly to the 
audit committee and has unrestricted access to the 
Chairperson of the board and all board members.
124  
The internal audit plan is based on a formal risk 
assessment.  The board requires timely correction 
of problems identified by internal auditors. 
The Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the 
PFM Act specify detailed requirements for a risk-
based internal audit function.
125  The 
independence, standards, functions and roles of 
the Bank’s internal audit are further specified in 
an Internal Audit Charter approved by the Board.  
The Bank conducts an external review of the 
internal audit function.  In 2005 this review was 
undertaken by the Institute of Internal Auditors 
which determined the function was independent 
and conformed to international best practice. 
                                                                                                                                                 
114 Good Practice: The Chairperson of the board is not a member of the audit committee, but could be 
invited to attend audit committee meetings as necessary by the Chairperson of the audit committee. 
115 DBSA: Section 27.1. 
116 DBSA: The Audit and Finance Committee has additional responsibilities with respect to risk 
management, which are discussed below in the body of this report.  In addition, it reviews and approves the 
annual budgets and annual and interim financial statements.  It advises the Board on i) appropriate financial 
policies, investment limits and funds mobilization strategies, ii) the annual income, expenditure and capital 
budget requirements, and iii) compliance and procurement policies.  
117 DBSA: Under the Board Charter, all Board members have authority to meet with any senior staff 
member. 
118 DBSA: As noted, the Chairperson of the Audit Committee is a signatory to the Shareholder Compact.   
119 DBSA: Treasury regulations issued pursuant to the PFM Act, Section 27.1.11. 
120 DBSA: In line with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. 
121 Audits by the state supreme audit entity are not considered a substitute, in part because such entities 
usually focus mainly on the use of public funds and budget resources. 
122 Good Practice: Such criteria include limits on the provision of consulting services by the firm to the SFI, 
and periodic rotation of engagement partners and audit firm.  BCBS P5. 
123 DBSA: Year-end March 31, 2006. 
124 Though the internal auditor may report administratively to the CEO. 
125 DBSA: Section 27.2. 
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The risk management committee is responsible for 
ensuring the adequacy of risk management policies 
and management’s adherence to such policies, 
including specific risk limits. The committee 
explicitly addresses credit, interest rate, foreign 
exchange rate, and operational risk
.
The Audit and Finance Committee assists the 
Board in evaluating the adequacy and 
effectiveness of risk management processes, 
reviews significant risk exposures, performs an 
assurance function in respect of enterprise-wide 
risk management, and provides strategic direction 
regarding asset and liability management.
126
The specialized Credit Committee of the Board is 
comprised of five members, four of which are 
non-executive, and is chaired by an independent 
non-executive member.  It reviews and approves 
all credit extensions and is accountable to the 
Board for portfolio management, the review of 
significant credit exposures, and the adequacy of 
provisions for credit losses.
127
DBSA has a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) to which 
report a Credit Risk unit and an Operational Risk 
unit that are functionally independent of line risk 
managers.  The CRO has access to the CEO and 
the chairpersons of the Board and the Audit 
Committee.
128   
                                                 
126 DBSA: The Committee is supported in these respects by two management committees (the Asset and 
Liability Management Committee and the Finance and Risk Management Committee). 
127 DBSA: To perform this function the Credit Committee reviews DBSA’s credit strategy, its credit risk 
management program, credit extensions to legal entities in which officer or Board members have an 
interest (including related policies), trends in portfolio quality and the credit risk management policies 
approved by the Board.  
128 DBSA: DBSA categorizes risk as between credit risk (including country risk), interest rate risk, currency 
risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. 
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The remuneration committee is responsible for 
formally assessing the performance of the CEO and 
reviewing the performance of other key managers, 
and for recommending to the board senior 
management remuneration.
129  The committee is 
responsible for making recommendations to the 
shareholder’s representative or the coordinating 
entity regarding board remuneration. 
Under the Article 17 regulations the 
Remuneration Committee must consider the 
remuneration of the Board and the executive 
members of management.  Under the Board 
Charter the Remuneration Committee twice a year 
is to make a formal evaluation of the CEO, in 
consultation with the Chairperson, and to provide 
a report of its findings for consideration by the 
Board.  The Committee must annually consider 
the remuneration of the Board and executive 
managers, ensuring that levels or remuneration 
are sufficient to attract, retain and motivate 
executives of the quality required by the Board.  
To assist the Committee, the CEO is required to 
cause an independent report to be prepared that 
relates the remuneration of the Board to other 
similar institutions in South Africa.  The 
Committee is also to take account of the result of 
the annual evaluation of the Board and its 
members.  Changes in remuneration are proposed 
to the shareholder only after consideration by the 
Committee and endorsement by the Board. 
The board has appointed a corporate secretary who 
reports to the board, and whose role it is to support 
the effective functioning of the board.  The 
corporate secretary provides board members, 
collectively and individually, with guidance as to 
how their responsibilities should be discharged in 
the best interests of the SFI.  The corporate 
secretary’s role is not less comprehensive than that 
specified under company law.
130
The role of the Company Secretary is specified in 
the Protocol and is in line with the functions 
under the Companies Act.  The Board Charter 
highlights the important role of the Company 
Secretary in corporate governance.  DBSA’s 
Board in fact has appointed a Company Secretary 
who performs the benchmark functions, among 
other duties. 
The board receives timely and sufficient 
information to judge management performance.  
Performance is measured in financial and non-
financial terms. The board requires that senior 
management prepare an annual budget as one 
element against which performance is measured. 
The Board receives quarterly and periodic reports 
from management and the Board committees.  
Reporting includes financial and non-financial 
measures of performance.  Besides regular 
financial reporting, the Board receives reports 
under the Balanced Scorecard and Social 
Accounting Matrix frameworks noted above.  See 
section 4 for details. The Balanced Scorecard 
methodology is used in translating high level 
strategic objectives and targets into an annual 
budget.  
                                                 
129 Good Practice: Rates of compensation are generally in line with comparable private sector businesses.  
Any performance-related incentives are related to objective measures of long-term SFI performance.   
130 Good Practice: The corporate secretary has explicit responsibility to support the chairperson and CEO 
in determining and administering the annual board plan, to ensure the appropriate induction of new board 
members, to serve as a key source of guidance to the board on matters of ethics and good governance, and 
to otherwise assist the chairperson and individual directors to ensure they have access to necessary advice 
and training.  The performance of the corporate secretary is evaluated annually in the same manner as 
individual board members. 
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The board has ensured that accounting and 
management information systems provide the 
information necessary to determine the costs and 
results of the provision of social and public 
services.
131
The Balanced Scorecard and Social Accounting 
Matrix frameworks seek the measure the results 
of DBSA’s developmental activities.  The Bank’s 
contributions to the Developmental Fund are 
clearly identified and reported.  The Bank might 
be able to make more explicit its accounting for 
and reporting of the costs of activities undertaken 
by the Bank itself on less than a fully commercial 
basis.
132  
The board uses explicit procedures to ensure the 
integrity of financial and non-financial 
reporting.
133
See above comments regarding the Audit and 
Finance Committee. 
The board, by means of the annual Directors’ 
Report and/or published financial statements, is 
explicit about how it balances tradeoffs between 
financial objectives, social service objectives and 
developmental objectives. 
The Directors’ Report in the Annual Report 
reports extensively on performance against 
objectives, including by disclosing performance 
against the targets set out in the Balanced 
Scorecard.  The Directors’ Report addresses 
economic/financial, environments and social 
outcomes.  See section 4. 
The board undertakes an annual self-evaluation to 
appraise its performance.  The evaluation 
scrutinizes the performance of the overall board, 
the chairperson, and individual members.  It 
assesses, among other matters, the adequacy of the 
mix of the skills and experience of the board, and 
the processes for nomination and election of board 
members and for management of conflicts of 
interest.  The results of the evaluation are 
communicated to the ownership entity. 
The Protocol sets out requirements for an annual 
assessment of the performance of the Board, 
requiring a review of its size, mix of skills, 
expertise and experience, and covering the Board 
collectively, the Chairperson, the CEO and each 
individual Board member.  The assessment is to 
measure performance in achieving the objectives 
set out in the required Shareholder Compact.  The 
Board Charter specifies that the Chairperson must 
annually report to the shareholder on the 
performance of each Board member and the 
Board collectively, and specifically review areas 
in which the Board or its functioning could be 
improved.  As an example, in the 2004/05 
financial year, the review determined that 
improvement was required in terms of continuous 
provision of information and training on business 
and accounting developments. 
                                                 
131 This might, for example, include maintaining separate accounts for such activities. 
132 DBSA: For example, the interest income forgone by charging below market interest rates on loans. 
133 Good Practice: Board members sign publicly disclosed financial reports.  
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The board has approved a code of ethics that 
defines standards for professional conduct and for 
dealing with conflicts of interest applicable to board 
members, management and employees.  The board 
has ensured the standards are well communicated 
within the SFI, and has implemented a compliance 
program.
134 The board is free of conflicts of interest 
or the appearance of conflicts.   
The Board has adopted a comprehensive written 
Code of Ethics that commits management and 
staff to high standards of ethical conduct in their 
dealings with the Bank’s clients and stakeholders.  
The Code is reviewed annually to benchmark it 
against best practice in other development finance 
institutions. 
4.  Transparency and Disclosure 
Overall, SFI accounting, auditing, transparency and 
disclosure standards are comparable to those for 
publicly listed firms.
135
As noted, DBSA is subject to the Accounting and 
Disclosure requirements of the Companies Act.
136  
Its actual disclosure practices are extensive, 
including an Annual Report incorporating the 
audited Annual Financial Statements and the 
Director’s Report, an accompanying Activities 
Report describing the development impact of the 
Bank’s activities during the year, an Information 
Manual issued in accordance with the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act (2000), and interim 
(six-monthly) results incorporating a strategic 
overview.  All reports, as well as extensive 
additional information, are available on DBSA’s 
website (www.dbsa.org).  In addition, DBSA 
submits financial and operational information to 
the National Treasury quarterly.  
The board is responsible for and ensures 
publication of an annual report, which is the 
principal vehicle for most of the disclosures cited in 
this section.  The annual report also includes full 
financial statements, including a detailed balance 
sheet, income statement, supporting notes and 
schedules, and a report on internal controls.
137
DBSA publishes full annual audited financial 
statements with accompanying descriptive 
notes.
138
                                                 
134 Good Practice: The board has established procedures for employees to communicate material and bona 
fide concerns directly or indirectly (e.g. through an independent audit or compliance process) and 
confidentially to the board.  
135 Good Practice: Use of international standards of best practice. 
136 DBSA: As well as to related requirements in the DBSA and PFM Acts. 
137 Supporting notes include disclosure of significant accounting policies employed. 
138 DBSA: The Annual Financial Statements include the following: statement on Board responsibility for 
financial reporting; report of the independent auditors to the Minister of Finance; assurance report of the 
independent auditors to the Minister of Finance;  Board of Directors’ report; balance sheet; income 
statement; cash flow statement; statement of changes in equity, and; notes to the financial statements. 
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Ownership structure is disclosed and transparent, 
including major share ownership (including legal 
ownership of state shares) and voting rights.  Any 
special rights or agreements that may alter the 
ownership or control structure (e.g., golden shares 
or special veto powers granted the state), are 
disclosed and transparent. Responsibility for 
exercising the state’s ownership (i.e., the ownership 
entity) are disclosed and transparent. 
The ownership structure (100% government of 
the Republic of South Africa), and the 
responsibility of the Minister of Finance for 
exercising the state’s ownerships rights, are fully 
disclosed and transparent.  There are no special 
arrangements altering the ownership or control 
structure. 
The state ownership policy is disclosed, including 
overall objectives of state ownership, the state’s 
role in SFI corporate governance, and the manner in 
which the ownership policy is implemented. 
As noted, the state ownership policy for SOEs 
generally is framed largely by the PFM Act, the 
National Treasury regulations issued pursuant to 
that Act, and the Protocol, as well as, for DBSA 
specifically, the DBSA Act and the Article 17 
regulations.  The Minister of Finance in the 
Annual Report provides his assessment of the 
performance of DBSA and his expectations 
regarding strategic direction and future 
performance.  As noted, the Minister also reports 
to two Parliamentary committees in this regard. 
Board structure is disclosed, which includes 
bylaws, board size, board membership, board 
member selection process, board member 
qualifications, other directorships held by board 
members, criteria for independence, any member’s 
material interests in transactions or matters 
affecting the SFI, as well as board committees’ 
terms of reference and committee membership. 
Board and Board committee size, membership 
and records of attendance, Board committee 
responsibilities and processes, and basic 
information about the academic qualifications and 
current employment of Board members are 
disclosed.  Bylaws, other directorships held by 
Board members, and member’s interests in 
transactions or matters affecting the SFI are not 
disclosed publicly.  However, the Corporate 
Secretary maintains a register of Board members’ 
declaration of interests which is updated annually 
and at the beginning of every Board and Board 
committee meeting.  
The number of board and committee meetings and 
the attendance records of individual members is 
disclosed in the annual report. 
Fully disclosed in the Annual Report. 
Senior management structure is disclosed, which 
includes responsibilities, reporting lines, 
qualifications and experience. 
Senior management is disclosed in the Annual 
Report along with basic information regarding 
their academic qualifications.  
  50Corporate Governance Benchmark  Evaluation of DBSA 
The organizational structure is disclosed, including 
the general organizational chart, key business lines 
and business processes, subsidiaries and affiliates, 
and management committees. 
In its Annual Report and elsewhere on its website 
DBSA provides extensive information about its 
organization, businesses, and business processes, 
including progress on steps being taken to 
strengthen the organization and align its capacity 
to its mandate and strategy. 
Information regarding board and senior 
management remuneration is disclosed, including 
policies, and board and senior management base 
and incentive compensation.
139
The Annual Report discloses fees, subsistence 
and travel payments for each Board member.  It 
discloses individual salaries, benefits and 
performance incentive payments for nine senior 
managers. 
                                                 
139 Good Practice:  Disclosure of remuneration on an individual basis. 
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The SFI discloses its overall objectives and whether 
and how they have been fulfilled.  It discloses the 
manner in which is deals with inherent tradeoffs 
among objectives. 
The Directors’ Report in the Annual Report 
discusses objectives and performance in detail.  It 
takes the form of an Economic Report, an 
Environmental Report and a Social Report. The 
Economic Report covers, among other matters, 
the actual delivery of products and services and 
their geographic and business sector focus, and 
reports on the developmental impact of the Bank.  
The Environmental Report provides a qualitative 
discussion of the environmental impact of the 
Bank’s products and services and its own 
operations.  Similarly, the Social Report provides 
a qualitative discussion of activities and impacts 
in areas such as human resource development, 
health and gender equality, and well as with 
respect to its employees.  The Directors’ Report is 
subject to external audit to confirm its 
quantitative and qualitative content. 
Interim (six-monthly) reports provide additional 
descriptive information regarding objectives.  
DBSA’s marketing program seeks, in part, to 
increase the public’s awareness of its mandate 
and performance. 
DBSA has developed and is enhancing a model 
that evaluates the potential financial performance 
outcomes of alternative strategic decisions.  The 
model is a tool to quantify the impact of tradeoffs 
inherent in its objectives and business policies 
(e.g. providing lower cost financing increasingly 
to higher risk municipal clients while maintaining 
financial self-sufficiency). 
Key business and financial performance indicators 
are employed in disclosing how objectives are 
fulfilled. 
The Annual Report provides key financial 
performance indicators and prior year 
comparators.  The Economic Report in the 
Directors’ Report quantifies and discusses, in the 
Balanced Scorecard format, DBSA’s performance 
against 31 specific targets under nine strategic 
objectives, including comparators to the prior 
year.
140  It provides performance information on 
the economic impacts (e.g., in terms of GDP, 
employment, and on low-income households) and 
social impacts (e.g., low cost houses constructed) 
of DBSA’s activities that are generated via 
internal economic models and the Social 
Accounting Matrix.  Details regarding the models 
are disclosed in a separate report accompanying 
the Annual Report.
141   
                                                 
140 DBSA: The high-level strategic objectives are: grow lending and investment business; broaden the menu 
of products and services to customers; promote and forge smart partnerships (including a target to attract 
one rand in co-financing by others for each rand financed by DBSA); optimize the benefits of interventions 
(including Black Economic Empowerment procurement targets); become an advanced knowledge-based 
  52Corporate Governance Benchmark  Evaluation of DBSA 
Measurable and verifiable social and public policy 
outcome indicators are employed in disclosing how 
objectives are fulfilled. 
In addition to those indicators presented in the 
Directors’ Report in the Annual Report, 
additional indicators are provided in the 
accompanying Activities Report, which also 
describes the methodology employed for 
calculating developmental impacts. 
A key element of DBSA’s mandate is to promote 
the role of the private sector in the provision of 
public finance.  DBSA policy limits the percent of 
larger projects that can be financed by the Bank.  
The relevant publicly reported direct outcome 
indicator is the ratio of DBSA’s investment in its 
projects relative to funding provided by others.  
The target value is 1:1.  Besides seeking co-
financing, DBSA promotes achievement of this 
objective through its local municipality capacity 
building and knowledge management programs 
geared especially to poorer local governments in 
South Africa, for which indicators are also 
published. 
Material risks and the means employed to manage 
and control risks are disclosed. 
DBSA’s Annual Report provides a detailed 
description of the Board and management 
processes applicable to the management of risks. 
The nature and extent of any state financial 
assistance (e.g., subsidies) or guarantees to the SFI 
is disclosed.
142
The fact that DBSA is exempt from income tax 
and is not requested to pay dividends, as well as 
the state’s capital contribution to DBSA and its 
high level of capitalization, are all disclosed. 
The SFI’s code of ethics and related policies and 
processes are disclosed.  The disclosures include a 
statement by the board regarding the extent to 
which it believes the code of ethics and related 
policies and processes are adhered to. 
The Bank’s Annual Report provides a detailed 
description of corporate governance and the Code 
of Ethics. 
Information related to conflicts of interest are 
disclosed, including the SFI’s policies related to 
conflicts of interest, the nature and extent of 
transactions with affiliates and related parties, and 
any matters on which any board members or senior 
managers have material interests. 
Legal requirements and policies, and the nature 
and extent of transactions with affiliates and 
related parties, are disclosed.  Matters on which 
board members or senior managers have material 
interests are not disclosed, although the register of 
Board member interests maintained by the 
Corporate Secretary is accessible to all DBSA 
employees.   
                                                                                                                                                 
institution (external); maintain sound financial health (including seven financial performance targets); 
ensure the business processes deliver effectively and efficiently on strategic objectives; attract, develop and 
retain competencies in line with employment equity requirements (including target for investment in 
training), and; become (internally) an advanced knowledge-based institution.   The 31 specific targets 
against which performance is publicly reported comprise a significant subset of those set out in the 
Corporate Plan annexed to the Shareholder Compact. 
141 DBSA: Activities 2004/05. 
142 See also Parts 2 and 3 of this evaluation framework. 
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Amounts paid to the external auditors for non-audit 
services are disclosed and described in the notes to 
the financial statements. 
Not disclosed. 
Board members have signed published financial 
statements.
143
DBSA’s published Annual Financial Statements 
are approved by the Board and are signed by the 
Chairperson of the Board, the Chairperson of the 
Audit and Finance Committee, and the Managing 
Director (CEO).  The Annual Report includes a 
description of the Board’s accountability for the 
preparation, integrity and objectivity of the 
financial statements. 
The frequency of disclosure corresponds to the 
nature of the information being disclosed and the 
needs of users. 
The frequency of disclosure is appropriate, being 










                                                 
143 Good Practice: The CEO and CFO certify that published financial statements in all material respects 
appropriately and fairly represent the operations and financial condition of the SFI. 
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